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NEGLIGENCE-THE UNIT RULE AND NORTH
DAKOTA'S COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE STATUTE
On February 21, 1983, Mark Beaudoin, an employee of
Wood Wireline, was preparing to conduct a pressure gradient
check on an oil well owned by Texaco, Inc. (Texaco). 1 As Beaudoin
was uncoiling wire from a large spool, the end of the wire struck
him causing him to become legally blind in the left eye. 2 On March
29, 1985, Beaudoin brought a negligence action against Texaco in
United States District Court for the District of North Dakota
alleging that Texaco failed to provide proper lighting and
supervision. 3 Beaudoin also contended that Texaco was negligent
by requiring the work to commence at an hour which necessitated
1. Beaudoin v. Texaco, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 512, 512 (D.N.D. 1987). Texaco hired Wood
Wireline to conduct a pressure gradient check on Texaco's oil well, CM Loomer #13, near Keene,
North Dakota. Id.
2. Id. at 512-13. It was dark when Beaudoin and a co-worker uncoiled the wire because they
.were required to arrive at the site before dawn to prepare the equipment. Id. at 512. John Spain, an
employee of Texaco, arrived after the incident to supervise the work. Id. at 513.
3. Id. Beaudoin brought his action against Texaco under North Dakota's comparative
negligence statute, 5 9-10-07. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-10-07 (1987) (suspened from July 8,
1987 through June 30, 1993). Section 9-10-07 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in
relevant part:
Contributory negligence does not bar recovery in any action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to
person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought.... When there are two or more persons who are jointly liable,
contributions to awards must be in proportion to the percentage of negligence
attributable to each; provided, however, that each shall remain jointly and severally
liable for the whole award....
Id. (emphasis added). This statute has been suspended by a sunset law adopted by the 1987 North
Dakota Legislature. See Act approved April 9, 1987, ch. 404, 1987 N.D. Laws 989 (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE S 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987)). Section 32-03.2-02 is a new comparative fault law which
repealed joint and several liability and adopted several liability for multiple tortfeasors. Id. In
addition, S 32-03.2-02 compares the plaintiff's fault to the combined fault of all persons who
contributed to the injury. Id. Furthermore, the law is prospective and, therefore, does not apply to
claims arising before the effective date of S 32-03.2-02, which was July 1, 1987. Id. For a more
detailed discussion on the prospective application of the new comparative fault law, see infra notes 8495 and accompanying text.
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that the equipment be erected in the dark. 4 Upon conclusion of the
trial, the jury awarded damages of $44,057.04 and apportioned the
negligence causing the injury as follows: sixty percent to employer
Wood Wireline, which was not a defendant in the action; thirty
percent to Beaudoin; and ten percent to Texaco. 5 The narrow
question before the federal district court was whether, in cases
involving a negligent plaintiff and more than one negligent
defendant, North Dakota's comparative negligence law compares
the plaintiff's negligence to the defendants individually, or
compares it to the defendants in the aggregate, in determining
whether the plaintiff was barred from recovery pursuant to section
9-10-07 of the North Dakota Century Code. 6 Section 9-10-07
provides that a plaintiff in a negligence action must be less
negligent than the defendant in order to recover damages. 7 The
court determined that Beaudoin's negligence ought to be compared
4. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 513. Texaco denied any negligence on its part and alleged that
Beaudoin negligently handled the wire. Id.
5. Id. Wood Wireline was immune from liability pursuant to § 65-04-28 of North Dakota's
Worker's Compensation Law. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-04-28 (1985). Section 65-04-28
provides in relevant part:
Employers who comply with the provisions of this chapter shall not be liable to
respond in damages at common law or by statute for injury to or death of any
employee, wherever occurring, during the period covered by the premiums paid into
the fund.

Id.
6. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 513; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987) (suspended from July 8,
1987 through June 30, 1993) (contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action if such
negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought).
Beaudoin was a case of first impression in North Dakota because the issue of whether the individual or
unit rule should be applied in North Dakota had not been decided. Id. Actions that arise afterJuly 1,
1987, are governed by North Dakota's new comparative fault law. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.202 (Supp. 1987). For a discussion of § 32-03.2-02, see supra note 3. The new comparative fault. law
has adopted the unit rule. Id. Unit rule jurisdictions find that public policy and statutory
construction favor comparing the plaintiff's negligence to the combined fault of all the defendants as
a unit, rather than individually, in determining whether the plaintiff will be barred from recovery.
See, e.g., Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883, 890 (Colo. 1983). In Mountain Mobile,
the Colorado Supreme Court applied the unit rule to Colorado's forty-nine percent comparative
negligence law when it allowed a plaintiff with apportioned fault of one-third to recover from two
defendants who also had negligence apportioned at one-third each. Id. The court found the
combined comparison approach provided better results in the vast majority of cases. Id. at 888. The
court stated that the unit rule does not base the plaintiff's recovery on the fortuitous circumstance of
how many defendants caused the injury, but rather financial responsibility for an injury is divided
according to fault as long as the plaintiff is less than fifty percent negligent in a not as great as (fortynine percent) modified comparative negligence jurisdiction. Id. Thus, the plaintiff and defendant are
ultimately treated more fairly since their rights and obligations are determined according to their
actual degree of fault. Id. However, jurisdictions that compare the plaintiff's fault to that of each
defendant individually follow the individual (Wisconsin) rule. See Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1,
__
624 P.2d 383, 394 (1980) (Idaho Supreme Court applied the individual rule in barring
Odenwalt from recovering from a less negligent codefendant). For a discussion of Odenwalt, see infra
notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
7. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987) (suspended from July 8, 1987 through June 30, 1993)
(contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action if such negligence was not as great as
the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought).
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to the combined negligence of Wood Wireline and Texaco.8
Therefore, the court held that since Beaudoin's negligence was not
as great as the combined negligence of Wood Wireline and Texaco,
and because North Dakota's comparative negligence law provided
for joint and several liability, Texaco was liable to Beaudoin for
seventy percent of his damages. 9 Beaudoin v. Texaco, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 512 (D.N.D. 1987).
Comparative negligence arose as a means to correct the
harshness of contributory negligence.' 0 The common-law doctrine
of contributory negligence precluded a plaintiff's recovery if the
plaintiff contributed to the happening of the event that injured the
plaintiff." Although contributory negligence was at first well
received in the United States, 12 the harshness of the doctrine soon
initiated the implementation of ameliorative devices such as
comparative negligence.' 3 Comnarative negligence apportions
8. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 517.
9. Id. at 518. The court stated that Texaco was liable for Wood Wireline's negligence because
in North Dakota, a joint tortfeasor is liable for the share of negligence attributable to a statutorily
immune employer. Id, For a discussion of this rule, see infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
10. See Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 120 (N.D. 1979) (comparative negligence
act was enacted to eliminate the inequities under contributory negligence which permitted no
recovery if the plaintiffwas merely one percent contributorily negligent).
11. See C. HEFT & C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL S 1.10, at 3 (rev. ed. 1986)
(contributory negligence prohibits one guilty of any degree of negligence from recovering for his
damages or injury). Contributory negligence originated in England in 1809. See Butterfield v.
-, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (1809). In Butterfield, the plaintiff left a pub at
Forrester, 11 East 60,
, 103 Eng. Rep. at 926-27. Soon thereafter
dusk and began riding his horse at a fast speed. Id. at __
the horse and plaintiff ran into a pole placed across the road by the defendant. Id. at -. , 103 Eng.
Rep. at 927. A witness observed that the plaintiff could have avoided the pole if he was not riding at a
rapid pace. Id. Lord Ellenborough of the King's Bench held that a plaintiff cannot receive damages
for injuries that arose from a defendant's negligence if the plaintiff did not use ordinary care to avoid
the result of the defendant's negligence. Id. Thus, the plaintiff in Butterfield could not recover for his
damages arising from the collision with the pole because his excessive speed on the horse at dusk
showed a lack of ordinary care. Id.
One of the first American cases that applied contributory negligence was decided in 1824. See
Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621, 624, 13 Am. Dec. 464, 464 (1824). In Smith the plaintiff's
agent drove a horse and wagon belonging to the plaintiffover a wood pile that was left lying on the
road. Id. at 622, 13 Am. Dec. at 464-65. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the
defendant was negligent in leaving the wood pile on the highway. Id. at 622, 13 Am. Dec. at 465.
The court stated, however, that the plaintiff could recover his damages only if he showed that his
agent used ordinary care in driving the horse drawn wagon, Id. at 623, 13 Am. Dec. at 465. At the
trial level the agent was found to have lacked the ordinary care to avoid the accident because he
negligently drove the wagon down the hill, at night, instead of walking the horse and wagon slowly
down the steep incline. Id. at 622-23, 13 Am. Dec. at 465. Thus, the court affirmed the jury's verdict
for the defendant. Id. at 624, 13 Am. Dec. at 467.
12. See Turk, Comparative Ne'li4 ence on the March 28 CHI.J-]KENT L. REV. 189, 198-99 (1950).
Turk contends that contributory negligence was favorably received in the United States because of
the economic conditions and an apparent breakdown in the jury system during the early to middle
1800s. Id.
13. See id. at 203. Turk explains that courts have tried many devices to lessen the harsh result of
contributory negligence, including disallowing its application when the defendant's actions were
willful, wanton, or reckless. Id. at 203-04. Turk contends that comparative negligence is the device
most widely used to decrease the unfair results of contributory negligence. See id. at 206. Another
exception to contributory negligence developed in the form of the last clear chance doctrine. See
Davies v. Mann, 10 M. W. 546, 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588, 589 (1842). In Davies, the plaintiff shackled
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liability for damages in proportion to the fault of each contributor
causing the injury or damages. ' 4
The first sign of comparative negligence arose either in the sea
laws of the late Middle Ages or during the Roman Era.15 These
laws initially apportioned the loss arising from collisions equally,
but later developed into a scheme that apportioned the loss
according to fault. 16 It was, however, the railroad acts of the early
1900s that had the greatest impact in the United States on
comparing the fault of the parties. I7
One of the first railroad acts to adopt comparative negligence
was the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) of 1908 which
diminished the recovery allowed in railroad accidents according to
the employee's fault. 8 FELA rejected the equal division of
liability rule pursuant to admiralty law and instead adopted a
"pure'
comparative negligence apportionment scheme. 19 The
the feet of his donkey so it could graze next to the highway. Id. at 546, 152 Eng. Rep. at 588. The
defendant's servant drove the defendant's horse and wagon into the plaintiff's donkey. Id. at 546,
152 Eng. Rep. at 588. The court stated that the plaintiff's abandonment of the donkey close to the
highway was not the immediate cause of the injury, but rather the defendant's servant caused the
accident by driving the wagon at a negligently fast speed. Id. at 548, 152 Eng. Rep. at 589. Thus, the
court formed what has become known as the last clear chance doctrine by stating that a plaintiff can
recover, even if negligent, when the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury; but failed
to do so because of his negligent act. Id. at 548, 152 Eng. Rep. at 589.
14. See C. HEFT- & C. HtFT, supra note 11, at 2. Heft explains that comparative negligence in its
simplest terms means that every person should be responsible to another to the extent he or she
caused the injury. Id.
15. See Turk, supra note 12, at 220. According to Turk, the sea laws declared that damages
arising from a returning ship colliding with an anchored ship should be halved if the masters and
mariners of the ships were willing to swear that the accident occurred without their fault and intent.
Id. at 220-21. Mole and Wilson state, however, that it was under the ancient law of Rome that the
First signs of comparative fault arose. See Mole & Wilson, A Study of ComparativeNegligence, 17 CORNELL
L.Q. 333, 337 (1932). According to Mole and Wilson, Justinian's Digest on Roman Law provided
that a party chargeable with an accident should assume damages in proportion to his fault. Id. Mole
and Wilson's interpretation ofJustinian's Digest as it relates to comparative negligence has led to
much debate among legal scholars. See V. SCHtWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGILICENCE 9 (2d. ed. 1986)
(the debate on the origin of comparative negligence focuses on the interpretation of Justinian's
Digest). Nevertheless, whether comparative negligence started in the Roman Era or the Middle
Ages, comparative negligence is not a modern idea. See id. at 8.
16. SeeTurk, supra note 12, at 220-23. Although the sea laws initially apportioned the damages
50/50, they soon developed an apportionment scheme where the entering vessel compensated the
other ship only for such part of the damages as experts might determine to be proper. Id. at 223.
Under Mole and Wilson's interpretation of Justinian's Digest, Roman law always apportioned
liability according to fault. See Mole & Wilson, supra note 15, at 337.
17. See Turk, supra note 12, at 334. Turk contends it was the hazardous conditions under which
railroad employees were working that did the most to stimulate the growth of comparative negligence
in the United States. Id.
18. See Federal Employer's Liability Act, ch. 149, S 1, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (current version at 45
U.S.C. 5 51 (1982)). The Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) provides in relevant part:
"Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several
States.. shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier
in such commerce...." Id. Mole and Wilson state the FELA adopts a system based on
comparative negligence whereby the carrier is exonerated from the proportionate part of the
'damages which correspond to the amount of negligence attributable to the employee. See Mole &
Wilson, supra note 15, at 359-60.
19. See Federal Employer's Liability Act, ch. 149, S 1,35 Stat. 65 (1908) (current version at 45
U.S.C. § 51 (1982)) (every common carrier by railroad engaged in commerce between the states is
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adoption of FELA set off a flood of labor legislation that
abolished the defenses of fellow-servant, assumption of risk, and
contributory negligence. 20 As one example, the Merchant Marine
(Jones) Act of 1920 adopted the FELA comparative negligence rule
in actions brought by seamen or their representatives for damages
against their employers in injury and wrongful death cases.2 1
Consequently, based on its growing popularity, comparative,
22
negligence soon spread beyond the labor field into other areas. It
was not until the 1960s, however, that comparative negligence was
23
adopted by the majority of state legislatures.
States that have decided to adopt comparative negligence
have chosen one of five forms: pure; modified - "not as great as"
(forty-nine percent); modified- "not greater than" (fifty
percent); slight-gross; and remote. 24 Under pure comparative
liable to its employee for injury or death according to the proportion of negligence attributed to the
carrier); Mole and WilSon contend that, as under the pure comparative negligence form, all that is
necessary under FELA is the amount of negligence of the carrier and employee because the
carrier's liability will be reduced by the negligence apportioned to the employee. See Mole & Wilson,
supra note 15 at 360-61. For a discussion on pure comparative negligence, see infra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text.
20. See Mole & Wilson, supra note 15, at 605. According to Mole and Wilson, the individual
states, inspired by FELA, proceeded to adopt laws in the area of worker's compensation which
abolished the common-law doctrine of contributory negligence. Id.
21. See Merchant Marine (Jones) Act, ch. 153, § 20, 38 Stat. 1185 (1920) (current version at 46
U.S.C. 5 688 (1982)) (a seaman who suffers personal injury may maintain an action for damages at
law and in such actions the rule applied to railroad injuries governs); see also Lindgren v. United
States, 281 U.S. 38, 41 (1930) (seamen's administrator brought action against the United States for
the wrongful death of the decendent resulting from a sudden release of a lifeboat which threw the
decedent down onto the dock). The United States Supreme Court in Lindgren stated that the
Merchant Marine Act incorporated FELA and its pure apportionment method in comparative
negligence cases. Id.; see Merchant Marine (Jones) Act 5 20, 46 U.S.C. S 688 (1982) (rule applied to
railroad injuries applies to injuries suffered by seamen); Federal Employer's Liability Act § 1, 45
U.S.C. § 51 (1982) (railroad carriers are liable for injury or death to an employee according to the
railroad's apportioned fault).
22. See, e.g., Death on the High Seas Act, ch. 111, S 6, 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (current version at 46
U.S.C. 5 766 (1982)) (contributory negligence shall not bar recovery but relief shall be reduced by
decedent's negligence). The Death on the High Seas Act allows a cause of action to arise when a fatal
injury accrues to a person while at sea. See id.
23. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 12. Schwartz believes that one reason for the delay in
-adoption of comparative negligence by the states was the lobbying efforts of major corporate
defendants and insurance companies who contended that the adoption of comparative negligence in
any form would be too costly. Id. at 13-14. According to Dean Prosser, some comparative negligence
legislation did arise prior to World War II when automobile accidents compelled consideration of the
uncompensated victim. See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH..L. REV. 465, 466 (1953).
Although some states such as Wisconsin did adopt comparative negligence prior to World War 11,
Prosser contends that the comparative negligence legislation in many states was put on hold because
of the decreased use of automobiles during World War II. Id. Apparently the pressure for
comparative negligence laws that existed before World War II did not spring up after the war
because comparative negligence systems did not catch on until the 1960s. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 15, at 12 (most states were hesitant to apply comparative negligence actions until the 1960s).
24. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 45-72. Schwartz contends that the change away from
contributory negligence did not necessarily require a division of the damages between the plaintiff
and defendant, but may permit full recovery by the plaintiff notwithstanding his or her contributory
negligence. Id. at 29 (citing Prosser, supra note 23, at 465 n. 2). Schwartz argues, however, that the
comparative negligence systems in the United States do not operate in that precise a manner; rather,
they involve some method of dividing damages when both the plaintiff and defendant have been
negligent. Id.
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negligence, a plaintiff may recover against the defendant notwithstanding the level of his own negligence, but damages are decreased
by the amount of his or her apportioned fault. 25 This form is viewed
by some scholars as the most equitable method of allocating
damages in negligence actions because it is the only form of
responsibility
comparative negligence which truly distributes
26
according to the fault of the respective parties.
Under the first modified form of comparative negligence, the
"not as great as" (forty-nine percent) form, the plaintiff's
contributory negligence does not bar his claim if it is less than that
of the defendant, but the plaintiff's damages will be reduced by the
percentage of his fault.2 7 The "not greater than" (fifty percent)
-_, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr.
25. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804,
858, 875 (1975). In Li, an accident occurred when Nga Li turned left across a southbound lane of an
intersection in front of a taxi owned by the Yellow Cab Company of California (Cab Company) and
, 532 P.2d at 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 861. Although Phillips
driven by Robert Phillips. Id. at
was driving at a negligently fast speed, Li was denied recovery by the trial court becauseshe was
532 P.2d at 1229-30., 119 Cal.
contributorily negligent in turning across the intersection. Id. at __,
Rptr. at 861-62. The Supreme Court of California, however, reversed the trial court and adopted the
pure comparative negligence form because the.court found that this form furthered the fundamental
purpose of comparative negligence - to assign responsibility for damages in direct proportion to the
, 532 P.2d at 1243-44, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76. Therefore, Li could
fault of the parties. Id. at __
recover against the Cab Company because pure comparative negligence assigns responsibility and
532 P.2d
liability in direct proportion to the amount of negligence of each of the parties. Id. at __,
at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
Schwartz maintains that the pure comparison method is the simplest form of comparative
negligence. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 47-48. For example, if ajury determines that the plaintiff
is ten percent negligent and the defendant ninety percent negligent, the plaintiff will recover $9,000
of his total damages of$10,000 from the defendant. See id. at 48. In addition, under the pure form, a
plaintiff may recover whether he is one percent negligent or ninety-nine percent negligent. See C.
HEFT & C. HEFT, supra note 11, S 1.50, at 16. The pure form of comparative negligence was
introduced into the individual states when Mississippi adopted it in 1910. See Comparative Negligence Act, ch. 135, 1910 Miss. Laws 125 (codified at Miss. CoDE ANN. S 11-7-15 (1972)) (plaintiff's
contributory negligence will not bar recovery, but damages will be diminished according to the
plaintiff's fault).
26. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 363 (the modified comparative negligence systems
distort the idea of comparative negligence because they do not distribute liability purely on the basis
of fault). Some authorities view pure comparative negligence as too liberal and as unjustly
rewarding the contributing plaintiff whose negligence could be the major cause of his own
injury. See C. HEFT & C. HEFT, supra note 11, at 16-17. Heft contends that a big flaw in pure
comparative negligence is that the party who recovers the most is the one with the most damages,
whether or not he is guilty of the far greater fault. Id. at 18. For example, if A is found to be ninety
percent negligent and suffers injury to the extent of $25,000, A is permitted to recover $25,000 less
ninety percent of $25,000, which results in an ultimate recovery of $2,500. Id. at 19. Suppose also
that B is attributed with ten percent of the fault and is damaged to the extent of $1,000; B can recover
$900 ($1,000 less ten percent) of his damages. Id. Thus, A, even though more at fault than B,
recovers a greater amount of money. Id.
27. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-10-07 (1987) (suspended from July 8, 1987 through June 30,
1993) (contributory negligence does not bar a plaintiffs claim if such negligence was not as great as
the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought). For the text of S 9-10-07, see supra
note 3. Wisconsin, in 1931, first adopted the forty-nine percent modified comparative negligence
form statutorily by allowing a plaintiff's claim only if he was less negligent than the defendant. See
Comparative Negligence Act, ch. 242, 1931 Wis. Laws 550 (1931) (contributory negligence shall not
bar recovery if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought) (emphasis added). Wisconsin, however, changed to the fifty percent modified
form in 1971. See Act of June 23, 1971, ch. 47, 1971 Wis. Laws 50 (codified as amended at Wis.
STAT. ANN. S 895.045 (West 1983)) (contributory negligence shall not bar recovery if such negligence
was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought) (emphasis added).
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form is substantially similar to the "not as great as" (forty-nine
percent) form except that it allows a plaintiff to recover if his or her
apportioned negligence is fifty percent or less. 28 The difference
between the two -modified forms of comparative negligence is not
minor because juries commonly apportion fault equally between
parties when their causal negligence is close. 29 Consequently, if the
Schwartz states that the "not as great as" comparative negligence form denies a plaintiff a recovery
only if his or her apportioned negligence is fifty percent or more. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at
69. Schwartz maintains that the forty-nine percent comparative negligence form arose judicially well
before Wisconsin's statutory adoption in 1931. Id. at 67. He asserts that Georgia, through a series of
judicial opinions, adopted the forty-nine percent form in the 1800s. Id.; see Macon & W. R.R. v.
Davis, 27 Ga. 113, 119 (1859); Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358, 362-63 (1859). In Macon, a train
collided with a buggy owned by the plaintiffand driven by his slave. Macon, 27 Ga. 113, 113-14. The
court allowed the plaintiff to recover for damages to the buggy and loss of the slave even though the
slave was contributorily negligent in driving the buggy in front of the train. Id. at 124-25. The court
held that in a suit against a railroad company, if it appears that there was mutual fault on the part of
the plaintiff and defendant, the party guilty of the greater wrong or negligence must be regarded as
an original aggressor. Id. at 119; see also Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358, 362-63 (1859). In Flanders,
the Georgia Supreme Court upheld its decision in Macon by denying recovery to a plaintiff for the
injuries sustained by his daughter when she flung herself in front of the defendant's buggy. Id. at
362-63. The court stated that when both the defendant and plaintiff are at fault, the fault of the
plaintiff may go to mitigate damages if the defendant is the most at fault. Id. at 362. Since the
plaintiff's daughter was the most at fault, the plaintiff was denied any recovery. Id. The forty-nine
percent modified comparative negligence form was finally explicitly adopted by Georgia in a 1904
case. See Christian v. Macon R.R. & Light Co., 120 Ga. 314,
-, 47 S.E. 923, 923 (1904) (if the
plaintiff and defendant are both negligent, the plaintiff can recover unless his negligence is equal to
or greater than the negligence of the defendant).
28. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 70. In a situation in which the plaintiff has suffered
$10,000 in damages and both the plaintiff and defendant are apportioned fifty percent of the fault,
the fifty percent comparative negligence form allows the plaintiff to recover $5,000. Id. at 71. The
reason the plaintiff is allowed to recover is because the plaintiff's negligence is not greater than the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. Id.; seeWts. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West
1983) (contributory negligence will not bar recovery if the negligence of the person is not greater than
the defendant). Under the forty-nine percent modified comparative negligence rule, however, the
plaintiff would be denied recovery because before recovery is allowed, the plaintiff's apportioned
negligence must be not as great as the negligence of the defendant. See N.D. CFNT. COD. § 9-10-07
(1987) (suspended from July 8, 1987 through June 30, 1993) (contributory negligence does not bar a
plaintiff's claim if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the defendant). For the text of
S 9-10-07, see supra note 3.
29. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 32. Schwartz contends that attorneys who have litigated
comparative negligence feel that juries are inclined to return verdicts finding the parties both fifty
percent at fault when both parties substantially contributed to the damages sustained by the plaintiff.
Id.
The modified forms of comparative negligence have been justified by the Supreme Court of
West Virginia on the basis that a person should not recover damages when he is more at fault than
the defendants. See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (1979). In Bradley, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in determining whether to adopt pure or modified
comparative negligence in West Virginia, held that the forty-nine percent modified form of
comparative negligence is the most equitable rule. Id. The court believed that a party should not
recover, as allowed under the pure form, when he or she substantially contributed to the damages.
Id.
Although the argument that a party who substantially contributes to his or her own injury
should not recover is strong, modified comparative negligence has been found to be impractical and
confusing in application. SeeProsser, supra note 23, at 491. Prosser maintains that appeals have
multiplied under the modified comparative negligence forms because the courts are constantly being
asked to determine whether the particular conduct of the plaintiff amounts to negligence at least
equal to that of the defendant's. Id. Prosser also contends that modified comparative negligence can
only be justified on grounds of political compromise. Id. at 484. Prosser asserts that the modified
forms of comparative negligence arose by compromises in the state legislatures which went part of
the way to apportionment, but stopped short when compromise with the groups contesting the
change from contributory negligence could be reached. Id.
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jury apportions fault on a fifty-fifty basis, a plaintiff will be denied
recovery under the "not as great as" (forty-nine percent) form but
30
not under the "not greater than" (fifty percent) form.
The two other modified comparative negligence forms
adopted by the states, slight-gross and remote, are not widely
followed.3 1 The slight-gross rule allows a plaintiff to recover when
his or her negligence was slight in comparison with the negligence
of the defendant, but no recovery is allowed if the plaintiff's
negligence is found to be the direct cause of the harm. 32 The remote
rule declares that a plaintiff's negligence will not bar recovery if his
negligence is remote, but the damages recoverable will be reduced
in proportion to his fault. 33 The confusion created by these two
comparative negligence rules, like all modified rules, has led to
34
numerous appeals.
Once the decision is made to adopt modified comparative
negligence, the focus of the courts and legislatures is whether to
apply the combined negligence rule, commonly referred to as the
unit rule, or the individual rule, to multitortfeasor comparative
30. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 71.
31. Id. at 61. Schwartz maintains that Nebraska and South Dakota are the only states that
follow the slight-gross comparative negligence rule. Id. at 61. He also states that the remote rule is
followed only by Tennessee. Id. at 60; see also Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686, __,
214 S.W. 869,
871 (1919) (Tennessee Supreme Court held that decedent's estate may recover in its wrongful death
action if decedent's negligence was a remote cause of the car accident).
32. See NEB. REv. STAT.S 25-21,185 (1985) (plaintiff's negligence shall not bar recovery when it
is slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 5 20-9-2
(1987) (plaintiff's negligence shall not bar recovery when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
was slight and defendant's negligence was gross in comparison). The comparison between the
plaintiff and defendant under the slight-gross method is to be made in each particular case, rather
than in the abstract ideal such as the reasonable prudent man theory. See Crabb v. Wade, 84 S.D.
93,
-,
167 N.W.2d 546, 549 (1969). In Crabb, the plaintiff's negligence in walking alongside a
highway in the evening was determined to be slight when compared to defendant's negligence of
being intoxicated while driving, even though courts would usually find walking alongside a highway
at night to be highly negligent. Id. at 549. As with modified and pure comparative negligence, the
plaintiff's damages were reduced under the slight-gross rule by the percentage of total negligence
attributable to the plaintiff. Id.
33. See Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686,
-,
214 S.W. 869, 870 (1919). In Beach, the
decedent's chauffeur drove a car, in which the decedent was riding, through an intersection. Id. at
214 S.W. at 869. The defendant drove her car into the intersection at about 40 miles per hour.
Id. at __,
214 S.W. at 869. A collision resulted which killed the decedent. Id. at -, 214 S.W. at
869. The court held that the chauffeur's negligence in proceeding into the intersection in front of
defendant was remotely connected to the accident because defendant's speeding precluded her from
using ordinary skill and care to avoid the accident. Id. at -, 214 S.W. at 871. Schwartz suggests
that Tennessee's remote comparison rule is similar to the last clear chance doctrine because the
plaintiff's negligence is remote if the defendant had a clear chance to avoid the accident. See V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 60.
34. See Prosser, supra note 23, at 489. According to Prosser, the slight-gross rule leads to
confusion and excessive appeals because of the vague meaning of "slight" and "gross." Id. In
addition, Schwartz states that the Tennessee courts have had their share of difficulty in applying the
remote rule. See 'V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 60. To illustrate the confusion Tennessee courts have
experienced in applying the remote form of comparative negligence, Tennessee defines a remote
cause as "that which may have happened and yet no injuries have occurred notwithstanding that no
injury could have occurred if it had not happened." See, e.g., DeRosset v. Malone, 34 Tenn. App.
451, 475, 239 S.W.2d 366, 377 (1951) (remote cause is that which is not the procuring, efficient or
predominant cause).
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negligence actions. 5 The unit rule emerged from Arkansas in the
1962 case of Walton v. Tull.36 In Walton, Luther Tull was riding in
the right front seat of a car driven by Richard Walton. 37 As Walton
was passing a car driven by D.A. Brigham, Brigham started to turn
left, which caused a minor side to side collision. 3" When Tull
opened the door to exit the car, after the cars had stopped on the left
shoulder of the road, Henry Glenn, who was driving his car from
the other direction, hit Tull's door causing Tull's leg to be seriously
injured.3 9 Tull brought a negligence action against all three drivers
and the jury apportioned the negligence causing Tull's injury as
follows: sixty percent to Glenn; twenty percent to Walton; ten
percent to Tull; and ten percent to Brigham. 40 Tull contended on
his cross-appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to
41
recover from Brigham simply because they were equally at fault.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that Tull could recover
from Brigham because Arkansas' forty-nine percent comparative
negligence statute allows Tull's negligence to be compared against
the combined negligence of all the defendants in determining
whether Tull is barred from recovery. 4 2 The court believed that the
Arkansas Legislature intended to deny a plaintiff his or her
35. See Steenson, The Fault With Comparative Fault: The Problem of Individual Comparison in a
Modified Comparative FaultJurisdiction, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1985). Steenson states that
courts usually decide which rule to adopt based on legislative intent and public policy. Id.
36. 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962).
37. Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882,
, 356 S.W.2d 20, 21 (1962). Tull furnished the car
because the vehicle belonged to a company in which Tull was president and a substantial
stockholder. Id. at __, 356 S.W.2d at 21.
38. Id. at-_., 356 S.W.2d at 21. As to the collision between Walton and Brigham, the jury
apportioned sixty-six percent of the negligence to Walton and thirty-four percent to Brigham. Id. at
-,
356 S.W.2d at 21. There was no appeal on this judgment. Id. at -, 356 S.W.2d at 21.
39. Id. at __ , 356 S.W.2d at 21. Glenn was so drunk that when he struck the car driven by
Walton he thought it was raining and, therefore, he did not realize that a collision occurred. Id. at
•., 356 S.W.2d at 21. Tull was exiting the car onto the highway because Walton parked on the left
hand side of the road. Id. at-,
356 S.W.2d at 21. The evidence produced at trial showed that Tull
did not adequately look before he exited the vehicle. Id. at -. , 356 S.W.2d at 21.
40. Id. at-,
356 S.W.2d at 21. The jury fixed Tull's damages at $27,500. The trial court
credited the $27,500 award with a $10,000 compromise payment previously agreed upon between
Tull and Glenn and entered judgment for the balance, $17,500, against Walton and against Glenn
for his remaining share. Id. at __
, 356 S.W.2d at 21. The court refused to allow Tull to recover
from Brigham because they were equally at fault. Id. at __
, 356 S.W.2d at 22.
41. Id. at -, 356 S.W.2d at 25. Tull asserted that his negligence should be compared against
the combined negligence of all the defendants: Glenn; Walton; and Brigham. Id. at __
, 356
S.W.2d at 25.
42. Id. at __,
356 S.W.2d at 26. Arkansas' comparative negligence statute at the time Walton
was decided provided that a person's negligence would not bar recovery where it was of a less degree
than the negligence of any person causing the damage. Id.; see ARK. STAT. ANN. S 27-130.1 (1961)
(repealed 1973) (plaintiff's contributory negligence shall not bar recovery where it is of less degree
than the negligence of any person causing such injuries). Arkansas clarified this statute in 1975. See
Act of 1975, ch. 367, 1975 Ark. Acts 922 (codified as amended at ARK. STAT. ANN. S 16-64-122
(1987)) (if plaintiff's fault is equal to or greater in degree than the fault of defendants, then plaintiff is
not entitled to recover). The Arkansas Supreme Court in Walton determined that comparing the
plaintiff's negligence to each defendant's negligence separately would cause unjust results in cases in
which the plaintiff's injuries were the result of the concurring negligence of several defendants. See

144

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

64:135

recovery only if his or her negligence was fifty percent or more of
the cause .of the injury and not simply when the negligence was
equal to or greater than the negligence of the person against whom
recovery was sought.4 3 The court justified this holding by reasoning
that to refuse Tull recovery when he was only ten percent negligent
would be a return to the common-law doctrine of contributory
negligence.

44

The individual rule arose in 1934 in the Wisconsin case of
Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. 4 5 The Idaho Supreme Court
followed Wisconsin's lead in Odenwalt v. Zaring"6 and adopted the
individual rule.4 7 In Odenwalt, John Odenwalt's pickup collided
with a cow that was on the highway. 48 The cattle belonged to
Don Zaring and were grazing on land owned by the Bannock Creek
356 S.W.2d at 26. Thus, the court recognized the injustice which arises
Walton, 234 Ark. at __,
under the individual rule when a plaintiff is precluded any recovery because there are several
defendants and the plaintiffs negligence, although small, is greater than the negligence of any single
defendant. See id. at __
, 356 S.W.2d at 26.
43. Walton, 234 Ark. at , 356 S.W.2d at 26. The court reasoned that the individual
comparison method was unjust because a plaintiff with one-third apportioned negligence may
recover against one defendant with two-thirds apportioned fault, but not against two defendants who
each have been found to be one-third contributorily negligent. Id. at-,
356 S.W.2d at 26. Where
the plaintiff's conduct was identical and the only difference was the number of defendants, the
common sense answer, according to the court, was that the plaintiff ought to recover. Id. at __
, 356
S.W.2d at 26-27.
44. Id. at __,
356 S.W.2d at 26. The court recognized that a problem could arise under the
combined comparison approach when there was an insolvent or immune tortfeasor and the
remaining defendant was liable because of joint and several liability, not only for his or her own
negligence but also the negligence apportioned to the insolvent or immune tortfeasor. Id. at __,
356 S.W.2d at 26. The court, however, found this possibility of unfairness to be the result of the
contribution laws and refused to narrow its construction of comparative negligence to avoid
inequitable situations due to insolvency or immunity. Id. at -, 356 S.W.2d at 26.
45. 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934). In Walker the plaintiff drove his car across a bridge on a
foggy night and proceeded to hit a truck left on the bridge by the defendant. Walker v. Kroger
Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519,
-, 252 N.W. 721, 721 (1934). Walker was found negligent
in driving at a rapid speed in the fog and the defendant negligent in leaving the truck on the
bridge and for not having a signal on the truck which would have warned Walker of the truck. Id. at
__
252 N.W. at 723. Also, the passengers riding with Walker were found to be at fault because
they gave negligent instructions to Walker as he navigated through the fog. Id. at __,
252 N.W. at
723. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the negligence attributed to the passengers, as well as
to Walker and the defendant, should be taken into consideration and that Walker's fault should be
252 N.W. at 727. The
compared against the defendant's apportioned fault individually. Id. at __,
court determined that the language of Wisconsin's comparative negligence law, which compares the
plaintiff's negligence to the fault of the person against whom recovery is sought, implies that an
individual, rather than a combined comparison of Walker's negligence with the defendant's should
be applied. Id. at __, 252 N.W. at 727; seeWis. STAT. 5 331.045 (1931) (contributory negligence
shall not bar recovery if such negligence was not as great as the person against whom recovery is
sought) (emphasis added) (codified as amended at Wis. STAT. ANN. S 895.045 (West 1983))
(contributory negligence shall not bar recovery if such negligence was not greater than the person
against whom recovery is sought).
46. 102 Idaho 1,624 P.2d 383 (1980).
47. Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1,__,
624 P.2d 383, 388 (1980). The court stated that its
decision was not based upon which rule, individual or unit, it believed to be the best approach, but
instead its decision was based on what the court determined to be the intent of the Idaho Legislature.
Id. at__ , 624 P.2d at 388.
624 P.2d at 384. The cattle wandered onto the highway through some
48. Id. at __,
inadequate fencing that was intended to pen in the cattle. Id. at__ , 624 P.2d at 384.
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Stockmen's Association. 49 In Odenwalt's negligence action against
the Association and Zaring, the jury found Odenwalt twenty-five
percent negligent, Zaring ten percent negligent, and the
Association sixty-five percent negligent. 50 The issue before the
court was whether Odenwalt could recover from Zaring, who was
less negligent than Odenwalt, where Odenwalt's negligence was
still less than the combined negligence of Zaring and the
Association. 5
The Idaho Supreme Court determined that Idaho's fortynine percent modified comparative negligence statute irplied that
the individual rule should be applied.5 2 The court stated that
Odenwalt could recover only from the Association because the
Association was the only defendant whose negligence was greater
than his.5 3 To allow Odenwalt to recover from Zaring, who was
only ten percent negligent, would, according to the court, go
against the forty-nine percent comparative negligence rule which
allows a plaintiff to recover only when his or her negligence is not as
great as the defendant tortfeasor's. 54 Although Odenwalt was
decided in a forty-nine percent modified comparative negligence
jurisdiction, the individual rule has also been applied in
jurisdictions which follow the fifty percent modified comparative
55
negligence form.
49. Id. at __,
624 P.2d at 384. The Bannock Creek Stockmen's Association was made up of
Indian members and it grazed both Indian and non-Indian owned livestock on the Fort Hall Indian
Reservation. Id. at -, 624 P.2d at 384.
50. Id. at
-. , 624 P.2d at 384. The jury found that Odenwalt had sustained $53,800 in
damages but allowed Odenwalt to recover only sixty-five percent of his damages from the
Association which amounted to $40,350. Id. at __
, 624 P.2d at 384.
51. Id. at __,
624 P.2d at 384. The trial court held that Odenwalt's negligence had to be
compared with each individual defendant's negligence. Id. at __,
624 P.2d at 384. Since
Odenwalt's negligence was greater than Zaring's, the trial court precluded any recovery by
Odenwalt from Zaring. Id. at _
, 624 P.2d at 384.
52. Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1, __
, 624 P.2d 383, 388 (1980); seeIDAHOCODE § 6-801
(Supp. 1987) (contributory negligence shall not bar recovery if such negligence was not as great as
the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought). The court reiterated Idaho's general
rule that when a statute is adopted from another jurisdiction, the construction placed upon the
statute by the courts of the other jurisdiction is also presumed to be adopted. Id. at __,
624 P.2d at
387. Since Idaho's comparative negligence statute was virtually the same as Wisconsin's, the court
felt that the Idaho Legislature intended Wisconsin's individual rule to also apply. Id. at __
, 624
P.2d at 387. Compare Wts. STAr. ANN. S 895.045 (West 1983) (contributory negligence will not bar
recovery if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery
is sought) with IDAHO.CoDE S 6- 801 (Supp. 1987) (contributory negligence shall not bar recovery if
such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought).
53. Id. at ._, 624 P.2d at 387.
54. Id. at __,
624 P.2d at 387. If the unit rule, rather than the individual rule was applied, the
court reasoned that an inequitable result would arise because Zaring could be liable for seventy-five
percent of Odenwalt's injuries while only being ten percent negligent. Id. at -, 624 P.2d at 387.
The court found it unfair for Zaring to pay the great majority of the damages when Odenwalt's
negligence was two and one-half times greater than Zaring's. Id. at-,
624 P.2d at 387. According
to the court, this inequity did not arise under the individual rule because under that rule Odenwalt
was barred because his fault was equal to or greater than Zaring's. Id. at -. , 624 P.2d at 388.
55. See Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, __,
290 N.W.2d 510, 517 (1980). In Reiter, Marian
Reiter, a real estate agent, slipped and fell while she was showing a house to a prospective purchaser.
Id. at __,
290 N.W.2d at 511. Reiter brought a negligence action against Paul and Linda Dyken,
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Proponents of the individual rule find the individual
comparison method, rather than the unit rule, to be more
compatible with the modified comparative negligence laws. 6 In
addition, individual rule jurisdictions view the unit rule as unjust
and harsh in situations in which a defendant less negligent than the
plaintiff is liable for the total amount of liability attributed to all of
the defendants.5 7 The individual rule is also favored because some
courts believe that it leads to uniform judgments throughout many
different comparative negligence actions that may arise. 58 Finally,
the owners of the home, and Edward A. Purtell Realty Company (Company), who was impleaded as
a defendant. Id. at-_, 290 N.W.2d at 512. Thejury returned a verdict apportioning thirty percent
of the causal negligence to the Dykens, twenty percent to the Company, and fifty percent to Reiter.
Id. at __
, 290 N.W.2d at'511. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the trial court erred when
it combined the negligence of the Dykens and the Company in determining that Reiter's negligence
was not greater than the person against whom recovery is sought. Id. at __
, 290 N.W.2d at 517.
The court found that the Wisconsin Legislature intended the individual rule to pertain to
comparative negligence because the legislature switched from the forty-nine percent comparative
negligence rule to the fifty percent rule without implementing specific language adopting the unit
rule. Id. at -_, 290 N.W.2d at 517; seeAct ofJune 23, 1971, ch. 47, 1971 Wis. Laws 50 (codified as
amended at Wis. STAT. ANN. S 895.045 (West 1983)) (contributory negligence shall not bar recovery
if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought)
(emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., VanHorn v. William Blanchford Co., 88 N.J. 91,
-, 438 A.2d 552, 554 (1981).
The court in VanHorn adopted and applied the individual rule to New Jersey's fifty percent
comparative negligence law by finding that a plaintiff who was fifty percent negligent was barred
from recovering where the defendants were thirty percent and twenty percent negligent respectively.
Id. at -,
438 A.2d at 556. The court stated that the use of the individual comparison rule was
consistent with New Jersey's comparative negligence law at the time which stated that a plaintiff will
recover if his or her negligence is not greater than the person against whom recovery is sought. Id. at
__,
438 A.2d at 554; see N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2A:15-5.1 (West 1973) (contributory negligence shall
not bar recovery if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought) (amended 1982). The court held that the use of the singular "person" rather than
the plural form strongly suggested a legislative intent that a plaintiff's negligence should be
compared to the negligence of one person at a time. VanHorn, 88 N.J. at -, 438 A.2d at 554. In
1982, the New Jersey Legislature overruled the court's interpretation of the 1973 comparative
negligence statute and implemented instead the unit rule. See Act of Dec. 6, 1987, ch. 191, 1982 N.J.
Laws 786 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. S2A: 15-5.1 (West 1987) (contributory negligence
shall not bar recovery if such negligence is not greater than the negligence of the person or persons
against whom recovery is sought) (emphasis added)).
57. See, e.g., Odenwalt, 102 Idaho at -. , 624 P.2d at 387. The court in Odenwalt stated that one
reason for the adoption of the individual rule was the unfairness that arose in cases where one
defendant was immune or insolvent and the defendant less negligent than the plaintiff ended up
paying the damages attributed to the defendants as a whole. Id. at __
, 624 P.2d at 387. But see
Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883, 889 (Colo. 1983). The Colorado Supreme
Court in Mountain Mobile adopted the unit rule to its fifty percent comparative negligence law by
allowing a plaintiff with one-third apportioned fault to recover from two defendants each of whom
had apportioned negligence of one-third. Id. at 890. In so holding, the court reasoned that the
unfairness to another defendant which occurred when a co-defendant was immune or judgment
proof, was the result of the worker's compensation and joint and several liability laws, and not the
result of the unit rule. Id. at 889. The court further contended that the existence ofjoint and several
liability in a jurisdiction shows an intent by the law-making body to place the risk of an immune
tortfeasor on the defendant rather than the plaintiff. Id. The court also stated that the unfairness to a
defendant less negligent than the plaintiff does not outweigh the injustice visited upon countless
injured persons denied recovery because several tortfeasors combined to cause the plaintiff's injuries.
Id.
, 624 P.2d at 387. In adopting the individual rule, the
58. See Odenwalt, 102 Idaho at
Idaho Supreme Court believed that an inconsistency would arise if the unit rule was applied to
624 P.2d at 387-88. It was
Idaho's forty-nine percent comparative negligence statute. Id. at -,
incongruous to the court to suggest that pursuant to the unit rule a plaintiff should not recover when
there was one equally negligent (fifty percent) defendant, but should recover when there were two
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the idea that a plaintiff should be barred from recovering against a
defendant when the defendant's apportioned fault is less than or
equal to the plaintiff's is furthered by the individual comparison
approach. 9
States which reject the individual rule believe the unit rule, in
which the plaintiff's fault is compared to the defendants' negligence
in the aggregate, is more in accord with modified comparative
negligence. 60 Followers of the unit rule interpret modified
comparative negligence as providing that a plaintiff's claim against
any defendant should not depend on the number of defendants but
should be barred only if the plaintiff's negligence is greater than
forty-nine percent, or, in jurisdictions which apply the "not greater
than" rule, fifty percent. 6' In addition, legal scholars have stated
that the legal theory of joint and several liability is advanced by the
unit rule because both of these rules allow liability to be imposed
62
upon any defendant who was less negligent than the plaintiff.

Moreover, the unit rule is believed to encourage settlements, which
63
is the goal behind many comparative negligence statutes.
defendants and one plaintiff who were all equally negligent (thirty-three and one-third percent). Id.
at -,
624 P.2d at 387. The court stated that under the individual rule one was barred from
recovery only if one's negligence was equal to or greater than the defendant's no matter how many
defendants caused the plaintiff's injury. Id. at
-, 624 P.2d at 387-88. Consequently, the court in
Odenwalt concluded that the individual rule would result in more uniform judgments than would the
unit rule. See id. at -, 624 P.2d at 388.
59. See, e.g., id. at __,
624 P.2d at 387-88. The Idaho Supreme Court stated that the
individual rule bars recovery when the plaintiff was as much to blame as the defendant, just as the
forty-nine percent modified comparative negligence rule allows a plaintiff to recover only when the
plaintiff's negligence was not as great as the defendant's. Id. at -, 624 P.2d at 387-88.
60. See, e.g., North v. Bunday, 735 P.2d 270, 275 (Mont. 1987). In North, the plaintiff brought
an action for the wrongful death of her husband against the State of Montana for failing to provide
drivers with a proper warning of an approaching dead end. Id. at 271-72. The plaintiff also sued a
trucking company for the negligence of its employee in parking the truck at the end of the roadway,
blocking the decedent's view of the dead end. Id. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover even
though the jury apportioned forty-five percent of the fault to the decedent, forty percent of the fault to
the trucking company, and fifteen percent of the fault to the state. Id. at 275-76. The court based its
decision favoring the unit rule on the grounds that comparative negligence was founded on the idea
that everyone was responsible for his or her negligence which caused injury to others. Id. at 275. The
court determined that the unit rule advanced this idea, that everyone is responsible for his or her
negligence, better than the individual rule did because the unit rule holds defendants liable for their
share of the fault as long as the plaintiff's negligence is below fifty percent. Id. at 275-76.
61. See id. In North, the Montana Supreme Court stated that a negligent plaintiff should share
the blame for any injuries resulting by having his recovery decreased by that amount. Id. at 275. The
court determined, however, that the plaintiffs recovery should be decreased only, and not barred, as
long as his or her apportioned fault is not greater than fifty percent. Id.; see Mountain Mobile Mix,
Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883, 888 (Colo. 1983) (court declared that financial responsibility for an
injury, in a forty-nine percent modified comparative negligence jurisdiction, should be divided
according to fault as long as plaintiff is less than fifty percent negligent).
62. See Note, Comparative Negligence. The Multiple Defendant Dilemma, 36 ME. L. REV. 345, 353
(1984). The note writer states that the existence of a joint and several liability statute indicates that
the legislature was more concerned with assuring the plaintiffs recovery than with the potential
unfairness that arises under the unit rule. Id. The unfairness arises because an individual defendant
will be liable for an amount greater than his or her fault. Id.
63. See Elder v. Orluck, 511 Pa. 402, __, 515 A.2d 517, 524 (1986). In Elder, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the unit rule was the proper multi-tortfeasor comparison rule to apply to
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Furthermore, the unit rule is preferred over the individual
rule because great inequities arise under the individual comparison
method when many defendants caused the harm which injured the
plaintiff.6 4 Plaintiffs have a difficult time recovering under the
individual rule when they are slightly negligent and the injury
results from an individual hazard for which .several parties are
responsible, because the plaintiff's negligence may be higher than
the negligence of any individual defendant. 65 For example, in Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. ,66 Clarence Borel contracted the
67
disease of asbestosis due to his daily contact with insulation.
Because Borel did not use one brand of insulation all the time, it
was impossible to determine which brand caused his disease. 68
Instead of denying Borel recovery for failing to disclose which
Pennsylvania's fitty percent comparative negligence law. Id. at __
, 515 A.2d at 525. Thus, a
plaintiff with twenty-five percent apportioned negligence was allowed to recover from the defendant
with only fifteen percent apportioned negligence because the combined fault of all the defendants was
greater than plaintiff's negligence. Id. at -, 515 A.2d at 524. A policy reason behind the court's
decision was that the individual rule discouraged settlements. Id. at __
, 515 A.2d at 524. The court
stated the reason for this result was that in cases in which there was some evidence of negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, defendants were encouraged to add more defendants and go to trial in an
attempt to lower the apportioned negligence assigned to them and, thereby, possibly escape liability.
Id. at __, 515 A.2d at 524.
Encouraging settlements would be an important policy consideration in North Dakota because
any construction of North Dakota's comparative negligence statute should be in accordance with the
promotion of settlements. See Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 121 (N.D. 1979) (the
comparative negligence statute in North Dakota should be construed according to principles such as
the promotion of settlements).
64. See Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882,
-,
356 S.W.2d 20, 26 (1962). In criticizing the
individual rule, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that to refuse recovery to a slightly negligent
plaintiff, because there were numerous defendants with less individually apportioned negligence,
would be a return to the common law doctrine of contributory negligence. Id For a discussion of
Walton v. Tull, see supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text. Moreover, according to the Colorado
Supreme Court, basing one's recovery on the number of defendants, rather than on the plaintiff's
negligence, is contrary to the idea of modified comparative negligence. See Mountain Mobile Mix,
Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883, 888 (Colo. 1983). The Colorado Supreme Court stated that the fortynine percent combined comparison approach of modified comparative negligence does not base a
plaintiff's recovery on the number of defendants, but rather divides financial responsibility for an
injury according to fault as long as the plaintiff is less than fifty percent negligent. Id. Thus, both the
plaintiff and defendant are ultimately treated more fairly under the unit rule since their rights and
obligations are determined in accordance with their actual degree of fault. Id.
65. See Steenson, supra note 35, at 37-42. Steenson maintains that the need for the unit rule in
multitortfeasor actions is expressly shown in cases such as those in which many defendants have
discharged pollutants causing the hazard which injured the plaintiff. Id. at 41. According to
Steenson, the activities of several defendants which create an individual hazard which caused a
plaintiff's injuries cannot be broken into apportionable harms. Id. at 40-41. Therefore, Steenson
contends that the individual rule would preclude a plaintiff from recovering because there would be
no proof that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as, or not greater than, the individual
defendant's. Id. at 41. Thus, Steenson contends the unit rule should be applied in cases where an
injury results from an individual hazard to which several parties have contributed. Id.
66. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
67. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1082 (5th Cir. 1973). Borel was
employed as an industrial insulation worker. Id. at 1081. Borel's exposure to asbestos caused a lung
cancer known as mesothelioma. Id. at 1082. As a result of the cancer, Borel died. Id. at 1082-83.
68. Id. at 1094. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that it was impossible to determine
with absolute certainty which particular exposure to which brand of asbestos caused Borel's disease.
Id. It was undisputed, however, that Borel contracted his asbestosis from inhaling'asbestos dust and
that he was exposed to the products of the defendants on many occasions. Id.
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mianutacturing company was to blame, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that all eleven manufacturers of the various
brands of insulation which Borel used during his work were liable
69
for Borel's injuries.
Although Borel was not a comparative negligence case, one
legal writer contends that it demonstrates the need to apply the unit
rule to cases in which many defendants contribute to an indivisible
hazard which causes a plaintiff's injury. 70 When a plaintiff is
negligent in being exposed to an individual hazard such as asbestos,
the most logical comparison of the plaintiff's fault is to the total
fault for the hazard to which the plaintiff was exposed, rather than
to the individual percentages of fault assigned to each of the
manufacturers of asbestos. 71 If the plaintiff's fault is compared only
to a single defendant's fault in cases involving many defendants,
the plaintiff has less chance to recover because the ability to do so
diminishes in inverse proportion to the number of defendants who
contributed to the hazard. 72 Because of the unfairness that arises
under the individual rule when there are numerous defendants or
when an indivisible hazard exists, the unit rule is thought to be the
better approach.7 3
Legislative intent and statutory construction have been the
main tools used by the courts in construing comparative negligence
74
statutes as providing for either the individual rule or the unit rule.
Individual rule jurisdictions contend that the use of the singular
69. See id. Since Borel was repeatedly exposed to the different defendants' insulation and since
the effect of exposure to asbestos is cumulative, the court stated that the jury could find that each
defendant was the cause of the injury to Borel. Id.
70. Steenson, supra note 35, at 40; see Borel, 493 F.2d. at 1094 (Borel was not negligent in
contracting the disease himself). According to Steenson, the unit rule provides a more equitable and
less complicated result in indivisible hazard cases because the trier of fact has to decide only whether
the plaintiff was forty-nine percent negligent, or fifty percent negligent in not greater than modified
comparative negligence jurisdictions, without having to define the negligence of the many companies
which contributed to the hazard. See Steenson, supra note 35, at 40-41.
71. See Steenson, supra note 35, at 41. Steenson asserts that by comparing the plaintiff's fault to
the total fault for the indivisible hazard, the trier of fact is precluded from having to find the
negligence of each defendant's contributions to a hazard which cannot be broken into apportionable
harms. Id. Steenson contends that if the individual rule is applied to indivisible hazard cases, the
defendants may not be held liable because their individual fault is not ascertainable. See id. Thus, the
unit rule is more equitable because it does not allow those defendants an easy way to escape liability.
See id.
72. Id. Steenson maintains that the individual rule is inequitable because under that
multitortfeasor comparison form, recovery depends not on the plaintiffs negligence, but rather on
the number ofdefendants. Id. Steenson states that the application of the unit rule avoids this problem
because comparison of the plaintiff's negligence under the unit rule is to the total fault for the hazard
to which he was exposed, which does not change with the number of defendants who contributed to
that hazard. Id.
73. Id. Steenson contends that adopting the unit rule will prevent the inequity of a tortious
defendant escaping liability because the number of other tortfeasors is great. Id.
74. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1182 (Wyo. 1981) (in
electing the unit rule, the court found that comparative negligence was the handiwork of legislatures
and not the judiciary).
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word "person" by comparative negligence statutes in the phrase
''person against whom recovery is sought" suggests a legislative
intent toward the individual rule. 75 However, some courts, in
construing the statutes, have determined that the legislature
intended the plural as well as the singular form of the word
"person" to be applied to the statute and hence, have adopted the
76
unit rule.
When a statute has been derived from another jurisdiction's
statute, many states, including North Dakota, use the case law
from that jurisdiction to interpret the new law.7 7 Therefore,
jurisdictions which derived their comparative negligence laws from
Wisconsin's comparative negligence law are presumed to have
adopted the individual rule.7 8 However, the presumption that
Wisconsin favors the individual rule has been weakened by recent
Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions which question the rationale of
the individual rule. 7 9 In fact, Wisconsin courts have never given
75. See, e.g., Stannard v. Harris, 135 Vt. 544, -,
380 A.2d 101, 102-03 (1977) (use of the
singular word "defendant" instead of the plural form in Vermont's comparative negligence statute
indicated a legislative intent to apply the individual rule because if the legislature intended to adopt
the unit rule, it would have included the plural term "defendants").
76. See, e.g., North v. Bunday, 735 P.2d 270, 276 (Mont. 1987). In North, the Montana Supreme
Court found the unit rile to be applied to Montana's fifty percent comparative negligence law. Id.
On its face, the Montana comparative negligence law allows a negligent plaintiff to recover as long as
the plaintiff's negligence was not greater than the person against whom recovery is sought. MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-701 (1985) (contributory negligence shall not bar recovery as long as such
negligence is not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought) (emphasis
added). The Montana Supreme Court interpreted the word "person" to be ambiguous and thus,
opened to the statutory construction provisions of Montana's code. See North, 735 P.2d at 273-74.
The court applied 5 1-2-105 of the Montana Code to interpret the word "person" in the comparative
negligence act, and found that "person" included the plural form "persons." Id. at 273; see MONT.
CODE ANN. 5 1-2-105 (1985) (in the code the singular includes the plural). Therefore, the court held
that the unit rule applied. Id. at 276.
North Dakota's comparative negligence law compares, the plaintiff's apportioned negligence to
the person against whom recovery is sought. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987) (suspended 1987).
For the text of § 9-10-07, see supra note 3. It is conceivable, therefore, to treat the word "person" in§
9-10-07 to entail the plural "persons" because North Dakota has a construction statute that allows
the singular to also mean the plural. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 1-01-35 (1985) (words in the singular
include the plural and words in the plural include the singular).
77. See, e.g., Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 118 (N.D. 1979) (there is a
presumption that North Dakota will follow Wisconsin's comparative negligence law because North
Dakota's comparative negligence law was derived indirectly from Wisconsin's); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1185 (Wyo. 1981) (when Wyoming derives a statute from
another state's statute, it is presumed that the case law construing the statute in that other
jurisdiction will follow the statute to Wyoming); see also infra note 102.
78. See, e.g., VanHorn v. William Blanchford Co., 88 N.J. 91, __,
438 A.2d 552, 555 (1981)
(court applied the individual rule to New Jersey's comparative negligence law because New Jersey
derived its law from Wisconsin's law); Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1185 (since Wyoming derived its
comparative negligence law from Wisconsin's comparative negligence law, the court applied
Wisconsin's adoption of the individual rule).
79. See May v. Skelley Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d 30, , 264 N.W.2d 574, 578 (1976). In Skelley, a
plaintiffwith negligence apportioned at forty-five percent of the total fault failed to recover from a ten
percent negligent defendant because the plaintiff's negligence was greater than the person against
whom recovery was sought. Id. at __ , 264 N.W.2d at 575, 578. The majority of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court was convinced that comparing the negligence of the plaintiff to the defendant's fault
individually led to harsh and unfair results. Id. at __, 264 N.W.2d at 578. The court, however, did
not believe that Skelley was the proper case in which to change to the unit rule because the court found
one of the defendants not to be negligent. Id. at -, 264 N.W.2d. at 578. But see Reiter v. Dyken,
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policy reasons for the individual rule, following it only on the basis
of stare decisis. 80
The current weight of authority among the states that have
adopted modified comparative negligence is that the unit rule
should be applied in comparing the negligence of the plaintiff to
that of multiple defendants.8 1 More than half the states that follow
the forty-nine percent modified form of comparative negligence
-, 290 N.W.2d 510, 517 (1980) (court upheld the individual rule in an action
95 Wis. 2d 461,
involving multiple parties). In Reiter the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not feel bound by the dicta in
Skelley to adopt the unit rule and chose instead to uphold the legislative intent backing the individual
rule. Id. at -, 290 N.W.2d at 517. For a discussion of Reiter, see supra note 55.
80. See Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883, 887 (Colo. 1983) (Colorado
Supreme Court refused to give much weight to Wisconsin's adoption of the individual rule because it
determined that Wisconsin adheres to the individual rule on the basis of stare decisis and legislative
intent). For a more detailed discussion of Mountain Mobile, see supra note 57.
-, 356 S.W.2d 20, 26 (1962) (court held that the unit
81. See Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882,
rule is the appropriate comparison rule to apply to Arkansas' forty-nine percent comparative
negligence law); Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883, 884 (Colo. 1983) (court
adopted the unit rule to Colorado's fifty percent comparative negligence law); Wong v. Hawaiian
, 642 P.2d 930, 933 (1982) (the Hawaii Supreme Court
Scenic Tours, Ltd., 64 Haw. 401,
applied the unit rule to Hawaii's fifty percent comparative negligence law); Pape v. Kansas Power &
647 P.2d 320, 326 (1980) (Kansas elected the unit rule as the proper
Light, 231 Kan. 441, __,
interpretation of its forty-nine percent comparative negligence statute); Graci v. Damon, 6 Mass.
-, 374 N.E.2d 311, 317-18 (1979) (court applied the unit rule to Massachusetts'
App. Ct. 160,
fifty percent comparative negligence rule by allowing a merchant in a shopping mall to recover for
injury sustained while he was trying to nail shut an electrical box); North v. Bunday, 735 P.2d 270,
276 (Mont. 1987) (court adopted the unit rule as the multitortfeasor comparative negligence rule to
apply to Montana's fifty percent comparative negligence law); Young's Machine Co. v. Long, 100
-, 692 P.2d 24, 25 (1984) (Nevada Supreme Court applied the unit rule in a wrongful
Nev. 692,
death action brought under the theory of strict liability); Hurley v. Public Serv. Co., 123 N.H. 750,
465 A.2d 1217, 1221 (1983) (court applied the unit rule to New Hampshire's fifty percent
__
comparative negligence form); Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Okla. 1978) (Oklahoma
Supreme Court adopted the unit rule when it allowed a plaintiff with negligence of thirty percent to
recover from a defendant with only twenty percent apportioned fault because plaintiff's negligence
515 A.2d 517, 525 (1986) (court held
was less than fifty percent); Elder v. Orluck, 511 Pa. 402, -,
that the unit rule should be applied to Pennsylvania's fifty percent comparative negligence law);
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft, 665 S.W.2d 414, 428 (Tex. 1984) (court stated that Texas' fifty percent
comparative negligence statute allows the plaintiff to compare his or her negligence to the combined
negligence of the defendants); Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 909-10
(Utah 1984) (court allowed a plaintiff to recover, under Utah's forty-nine percent comparative
negligence law, from a hospital and doctor for the wrongful death of the plaintiff's husband who was
only forty-six percent negligent in causing his own death); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163
256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (1979) (court adopted both the fifty percent modified
W. Va. 332, -,
comparative negligence form and the unit rule as the comparative negligence law in the state); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 52-572h (West 1987) (plaintiff's negligence will not bar recovery if the negligence
was not greater than the combined negligence of the defendants); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, 5 8132
(Supp. 1986) (plaintiff's negligence will bar recovery only if it is greater than the combined
negligence of the defendants); IND. CODE 5 34-4-33-5 (1986) (plaintiff is barred from recovering if his
fault is greater than the fault of all persons whose negligence contributed to the injury); IowA CODE
ANN. S 668.3 (West 1987) (plaintiff must have a greater percentage of fault than the combined
percentage of fault attributable to defendants before recovery will be denied); N.J. STAT. ANN. S
2A: 15-5.1 (West Supp. 1987) (contributory negligence will not bar recovery if such negligence was
not greater than the combined negligence of persons against whom recovery is sought); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson 1981) (plaintiffs negligence does not bar recovery if it is not greater
than the combined negligence of all defendants); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, S 668.3 (1987) (causal
negligence of all defendants is compared to plaintiffs apportioned fault).
A minority of jurisdictions follow the individual rule. See, e.g., Mishoe v. Davis, 64 Ga. App.
14 S.E.2d 187, 193 (1941) (Georgia Court of Appeals applied the individual rule to its
700, -,
forty-nine percent comparative negligence law in a wrongful death action arising out of an
624 P.2d 383, 388 (1980) (court
automobile accident); Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1, -,
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apply the unit rule. 8 2 Moreover, the majority of states that have
decided the multitortfeasor comparison problem in the 1980s have
83
elected the unit rule, making it the modern trend.
The 1987 North Dakota Legislature suspended the 1973
comparative negligence act and replaced it with a new comparative
fault law that went into effect on July 8, 1987, for a six-year trial
period.8 4 The new comparative fault law provides for the recovery
of damages involving tort claims, except products liability,
pursuant to a modified comparative fault system.8 5 The unit rule
and several liability, rather than joint and several liability were a
adopted the individual rule to Idaho's forty-nine percent comparative negligence law); Marrier v.
Memorial Rescue Serv. Inc., 296 Minn. 242, __,
207 N.W.2d 706, 709 (1973) (plaintiff, who was
one-third- negligent, was barred recovery under Minnesota's forty-nine percent comparative
negligence law from two defendants, who also were one-third negligent); Walker v. Kroger Grocery
& Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519,
-,
252 N.W. 721, 727 (1934) (court adopted the individual
comparison rule to Wisconsin's forty-nine percent comparative negligence law); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1183 (Wyo. 1981) (court applied the individual rule to
Wyoming's forty-nine percent comparative negligence law).
82. See sources cited supra note 81. Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Utah, and West Virginia are
states with the forty-nine percent comparative negligence form that also apply the unit rule. Id.
Georgia, Idaho, and Wyoming are forty-nine percent comparative negligence jurisdictions that have
adopted the individual rule. Id. The North Dakota Legislature adopted the unit rule for actions that
arise afterJuly 1, 1987, but has not decided which rule to apply for pre-July 1987 actions. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987) (contributory fault does not bar recovery unless the fault was
as great as the combined fault of all persons who contributed to the injury). For a discussion of S 3203.2-02, see supra note 3. Maine is a state with forty-nine percent comparative negligence statute
which has not decided on the issue. See C. HEFT & C. HEFT, supra note 11, at App. II. According to a
recent law review article, however, Maine will opt for the unit rule if and when it is required to
choose between the two rules. See Note, supra note 62, at 346.
In addition, seven states have adopted the unit rule by construing statutes so that their
comparative negligence law applies to both the singular "person" and the plural "persons." See C.
HEFT & C. HEFT, supra note 11, at App. II; seealso sources cited supra note 81. In adopting the unit
rule, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Utah have
applied both the singular and plural forms of the words "person"
and "defendant"
to their
comparative negligence statutes through the use of statutory construction. See id. All the jurisdictions
that follow the individual rule interpret the singular word "person" in their comparative negligence
statutes, as showing a legislative intention for the adoption of the individual rule. Seeid.
83. See sources cited supra note 81. Only Idaho and Wyoming have adopted the individual rule
in the 1980s. Id. Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Oregon, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Vermont
have all applied the unit rule in the 1980s. Id.
84. See Act approved April 9, 1987, ch. 404, § 15, 1987 N.D. Laws 989 (codified at N.D. CENT.
ConE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987)). Section 15 of chapter 404 of the 1987 North Dakota Session Laws
provides:
This Act is effective through June 30, 1993, and after that date is ineffective. North
Dakota Century Code sections 9-10-07 and 32-03-07 are suspended from the effective
date of this Act through June 30, 1993. Sections 9-10-07 and 32-03-07 as they existed
on the day before the effective date of this Act are in effect onJuly 1, 1993.
Id. Thus, the new comparative fault law has a sunset provision which requires the state legislature to
renew itbyJune 30, 1993, or thereafter it becomes ineffective. Id.
85. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987) (contributory fault does not bar recovery
unless the fault was as great as the combined fault of all the persons who contributed to the injury).
Products liability actions are controlled by the pure comparative negligence form. See id. at § 32-03.203 (contributory negligence on the part.of the plaintiff does not bar recovery, but plaintiff's recovery
is reduced by his or her fault). For a discussion of the pure comparative negligence form, see supra
notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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result of the new law while the forty-nine percent modified
86
comparison form in the 1973 act was retained.
The combined comparison approach adopted by the North
Dakota Legislature does not, however, apply to actions that arose
prior to July 8, 1987, if the law is found to have prospective
application only. 87 Furthermore, if the North Dakota Legislature
does not renew the law before June 30, 1993, the law in effect
before the enactment of the new comparative fault law will be
resurrected. 88
In North Dakota, the question of whether a statute is to be
applied prospectively hinges on legislative intent. 8 9 Both procedural
and substantive statutes are applied prospectively in North Dakota
unless the legislature indicates to the contrary. 90 However, the
legislature is not required to use the word "retroactive" in the
statute before it will be given such an effect. 91
86. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987) (contributory fault does not bar recovery
unless the fault was as great as the combined fault of all the persons who contributed to the injury).
Prosser and Keeton define "several liability" as limiting an individual defendant's total liability to
only his or her equitable share. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTs 475 (5th ed. 1984). See generally Note,
Multiple Party Litigation Under Comparative Negligence in Kansas-- Damage Apportionment as a Replacementfor
Joint and Several Liability, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 672, 675 (1977) (discussion of the implications of several
liability in a unit rule jurisdiction).
87. See Reiling v. Bhattacharya, 276 N.W.2d 237, 241 (N.D. 1979). In Reiling, the district court
dismissed Arthur and Justine Reiling's complaint because they failed to comply with a new state law
that required arbitration for medical malpractice claims by a medical review panel. Id. at 237. The
North Dakota Supreme Court held, however, that the new malpractice statute was to be applied
prospectively. Id. at 241. Since the Reilings' action arose before the effective date of the statute, the
North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the law existing prior to the enactment of the new
statute was applicable. Id. Thus, the Reilings were allowed to bring their medical malpractice action
without first having a hearing before a medical review panel. Id.
88. SeeAct approved April 9, 1987, ch. 404, 1987 N.D. Laws 989 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE
5 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987) (the new comparative fault law contains a sunset provision that requires a
renewal before June 30, 1993)). For a discussion of the new comparative fault law, see supra note 3.
Sunset laws require the legislative body to justify the law's existence periodically or they become
ineffective. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1288 (5th ed. 1979).
89. See Reiling, 276 N.W.2d at 241. In Reiling, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that all
statutes enacted by the legislature are to be applied prospectively unless the legislature clearly
expresses an intention to the contrary. Id. at 240-41. In addition, § 1-02-10 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides that no part of the North Dakota Century Code is retroactive unless it is
expressly declared to be so. N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-02-10 (1985).
90. See Reiling, 276 N.W.2d at 238. The North Dakota Supreme Court stated in Reiling that § 102-10 of the North Dakota Century Code applies to all statutes enacted by the legislature regardless
of whether they are substantive or procedural. Id.; seeN.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-10 (1985) (no part of
the Code is retroactive unless so stated).
91. See In reW. M. V., 268 N.W.2d 781, 783 (N.D. 1978). In W. M. V., a guardian for a minor
commenced a paternity action against oneJ.S. Id. at 782. The guardian contended that the Uniform
Parentage Act's statute of limitations applied to the paternity action and thus, the statute of
limitations had not expired. Id. J.S. asserted that the Uniform Parentage Act could not be applied
retroactively, and therefore, the shorter statute of limitations in effect before the passage of the Act
ruled. Id. at 782-83. The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, disagreed with J.S. and held the
Uniform Parentage Act to apply to actions arising before its effective date. Id. at 787. The court
stated that a statute was not required to contain the word "retroactive" in order for it to be so
applied. Id. at 783. Instead, the court espoused the view that the determination of whether a statute
was to receive retroactive application should be determined by legislative intent. Id. at 784.
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The language of the new comparative fault statute points
toward a prospective application. 92 The use of the word "accrue"
in the new law implies that the statute is only applicable to actions
that arise afterJuly 8, 1987. 9 1 In addition, the new law should only
be applied prospectively because the legislature did not clearly state
it to be retroactive and legislative debate underlying the passage of
the new law expressly refers to the prospective application of the
statute. 94 Consequently, as the legislative intent indicates, the new
comparative fault law should only receive prospective application
and any action arising before July 8, 1987, should be brought
under North Dakota's 1973 comparative fault law. 95
The United States District Court for the District of North
Dakota examined North Dakota's position on the multitortfeasor
comparison problem for pre-July 1987 actions in Beaudoin v.
Texaco, Inc.96 Beaudoin claimed that the combined, rather than the
individual, negligence of Texaco and Wood Wireline should be
compared against his apportioned fault in determining whether
Texaco is liable for the injuries sustained by Beaudoin. 97 Texaco
92. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987) (this act is effective throughJune 30, 1993,
and after that date is ineffective). See generally In re W. M. V., 268 N.W.2d 781, 784 (1978) (look to
the specific wording of the statute, as well as the act as a whole, in determining whether a statute
should be retroactively applied).
93. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987) (the chapter applies to claims that accrue
after July 8, 1987) (emphasis added). A cause of action accrues when a suit may be maintained
thereon. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 19 (5th ed. 1979). Accrue also has been defined as coming into
existence as a legally enforceable claim. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 8 (1979). Thus,
North Dakota's new comparative fault law should apply only to claims which come into existence'
afterJuly 8, 1987. See 1987 N.D. Laws 989 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE 5 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987))
(effective through June 30, 1993, and after that date is ineffective). For the relevant text of North
Dakota's new comparative fault law, see supra note 84.
94. See Act approved April 9, 1987, ch. 404, 1987 N.D. Laws 989 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE
32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987)); see also W. M. V., 268 N.W.2d at 784 (if no intention to apply a statute
retroactively is manifested by the legislature, then the statute is to be prospective in its operation);
HOUSE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT ON TORT REFORM, 50th Leg. Sess., at 2 (Feb. 10, 1987)
[hereinafter REPORT ON TORT REFORM]. Representative Kretschmar, answering a question about the
possibility of having two sets of laws if the comparative fault law was passed, stated: "if we enact this
Ilaw] onjuly I of 1987, we are going to have two sets of laws, this and [the] old law, [those] who got
hurt on [the] 30th ofJune would be under the old law." Id.
95. See REPORT ON TORT REFORM, supra note 94, at 2. Since the legislature did not manifest an
intention in the new comparative fault law that the statute should be applied retroactively, the North
Dakota Supreme Court should apply the new comparative fault law only prospectively. See id.; W.
M. V., 268 N.W.2d at 784 (if no statutory intent for a retroactive application of a statute is shown,
the statute should be applied prospectively); Act approved April 9, 1987, ch. 404, 1987 N.D. Laws
989 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987)). For a discussion of the new
comparative fault act, see supra note 3.
96. 653 F. Supp. 512 (D.N.D. 1987). The action arose on February 21, 1983 which was prior
to the effective date of the new comparative fault law. Beaudoin v. Texaco, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 512,
512 (D.N.D. 1987). The new comparative fault law which adopted the unit rule became effective on
July 1, 1987, and is to be applied prospectively only. See Act of April 9, 1987, ch. 404, 1987 N.D.
Laws 989 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987) (requires a renewal by June 30,
1993, or it will become ineffective)). For the relevant text of the Act, see supra note 84. For a
discussion of the prospective application of the new comparative fault law, see supra notes 84-95 and
accompanying text.
97. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 513. The application of the unit rule would allow Beaudoin,
though thirty percent negligent, to recover from Texaco, who was ten percent negligent, because
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contended, however, that Beaudoin's apportioned negligence could
only be compared against Texaco and Wood Wireline individually,
rather than in the aggregate. 98 Since the North Dakota Supreme
Court had not previously decided whether the individual rule or the
unit rule should be applied in multitortfeasor actions occurring
under North Dakota's comparative negligence law, 99 the federal
district court had the task of deciding a legal issue with no state
precedent. 100
Texaco's negligence combined with Wood Wireline's sixty percent negligence was greater than
Beaudoin's apportioned fault. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 9-10-07 (1987) (suspended 1987) (each
defendant isjointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's award). For the relevant text of S 9-10-07,
see supra note 3.
98. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 513. If Texaco's interpretation of North Dakota's comparative
negligence law was correct, Beaudoin would have been precluded from recovery against Texaco
because Beaudoin's thirty percent negligence was at least as great as Texaco's ten percent
apportioned fault. See id. at 518; N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-10-07 (1987) (suspended from July 8, 1987
through June 30, 1993) (contributory negligence shall not bar recovery if such negligence is not as
great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought). For the text of 9-10-07, see
supra note 3.
99. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 513. After reviewing the North Dakota case law, the federal
district court concluded that the multitortfeasor comparison problem in comparative negligence
cases is an open question in the state. Id. at 513, 515. The North Dakota Supreme Court had three
opportunities to adopt the unit rule, but in each instance, however, the case was decided on other
grounds. See Keller v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 360 N.W.2d 502, 504 n. 1 (N.D. 1984) (negligent farmer
denied recovery against hay baler manufacturer, implement dealer, and insurance company for his
injuries resulting from an allegedly defective hay baler because the issue of whether the unit or
individual rule applies to North Dakota's comparative negligence law was not raised); Keyes v.
Amundson, 359 N.W.2o 857, 858-59 (N.D. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 391 N.W.2d 602 (N.D.
1986) (the issue of which multitortfeasor comparison form applied in North Dakota was not raised on
a rehearing); Keyes v. Amundson, 343 N.W.2d 78, 80 n.1 (N.D. 1983) (the court refused to decide
whether the unit or individual rule should be applied in a negligence action because the issue was not
raised by the parties on appeal).
100. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 513. The traditional view of how a federal district court should
resolve an issue not yet settled in the highest state court of the law-determining state was set forth in
New England Ins. Co. v. Mitchell. 118 F.2d 414, 419 (4th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 629 (1941).
The issue before the court in Mitchell was whether a Virginia statute which limited the contestability
of an insurance policy to one year also decreased the time in which suicide by an insured could be a
defense for nonpayment by the insurance company. Id. at 416-17. Since the issue concerned the
interpretation of a Virginia Statute, the court applied Virginia law. Id. at 417. In finding that the
insurance company did have a defense because of the insured's suicide for the nonpayment of
benefits, the federal court based its decision on what it perceived to be the meaning of Virginia law.
Id. at 419-20. The court stated that when there has not been a decision at the local level resolving the
controversy, the federal courts are obligated to use their own judgment in deciding the conflict, with
a view of finding the decision which reason dictates and with faith that the state court would reach the
same decision when the question comes before it. Id. at 420. This rule was subtly changed in 1970 by
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. See Alabama Great S. R.R. v.
Allied Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 3, 8 (E.D. Va. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 467 F.2d 679 (5th
Cir. 1972). In Allied, Alabama Great Southern Railroad (Railroad) incurred great expense when one
of its trains derailed in Mississippi. Id. at 4. The Railroad brought an action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against Allied Chemical Company (Company) and
others for the defective materials in, and manufacture of, the train. Id. The defendants moved for a
dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction or for a change of venue to Mississippi. Id. The court
stated that although Mississippi had not construed the permissible lengths of its long-arm statute, the
long-arm statute did allow Mississippi to gain jurisdiction over the parties. Id. at 8. The court held
that when a federal court must decide an issue of state law not yet decided in the state, the federal
court must attempt to arrive at a decision which it believes in faith the highest state court would reach. Id.
The Allied Chemical rule, that an undecided state issue should be determined by what the federal
court believes the state supreme court would have decided, rather than what the federal court views
as the best answer, is the majority rule. See, e.g., Stancil v. Merganthaler Linotype Co., 589 F.
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The court in Beaudoin concluded that the unit rule was the
appropriate interpretation of North Dakota's 1973 comparative
negligence law. 10 1 The court observed that North Dakota is
presumed to follow Wisconsin's and Minnesota's interpretations of
their comparative negligence laws because section 9-10-07 of the
North Dakota Century Code was derived from Wisconsin's
comparative negligence statute, which Minnesota has also
adopted. 10 2 This presumption, however, was not absolute in the
court's view.'10 3 Moreover, the court discovered no previous North
Dakota case in which Wisconsin or Minnesota case law was
dispositive of an issue involving North Dakota's 1973 comparative
negligence law. 104 Notwithstanding this finding, the court
Supp. 78, 81 (D. Haw.1984) (court predicted that the Hawaii Supreme Court would follow the
majority rule and disallow the plaintiff's claim for injury to reputation in his breach ofcontract suit).
The federal district court in Beaudoin followed the majority rule espoused in Allied Chemical and
declared that although it would not presume the thinking of the North Dakota Supreme Court, it
would examine and weigh the persuasive authority as it believed the North Dakota Supreme Court
would if the issue were before it. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 514.
101. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 515. The court recognized that the adoption of the unit rule was
in direct conflict with Wisconsin's and Minnesota's adoption of the individual rule, but the court
believed that the unit rule was the approach that overwhelming authority dictated. Id.
102. Id.; see Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 118 (N.D. 1979). In Bartels, the
plaintiff was seriously injured when the jeep he was riding in went over a cliff and landed on its roof.
Id. at 115. The land on which the accident took place was under lease to the City of Williston. Id.
Subsequently, the plaintiff gave a release to the driver of the jeep and brought an action for
negligence against the city. Id. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota
certified questions to the North Dakota Supreme Court asking if, in an action for negligence, the
nonsettling tortfeasor is liable only for the percentage of the award equal to the amount of negligence
attributed to him. Id. In answering in the affirmative, the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted
Wisconsin's interpretation of released defendants in comparative negligence actions. Id. at 119; see
Perringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, __,
124 N.W.2d 106, 111-12 (1963) (the issue between the
plaintiff and the nonsettling defendant is the percentage of causal negligence of the nonsettling
defendant which can only be determined by a proper allocation of the causal negligence of all the
joint tortfeasors). The court in Bartels stated that when a statute is taken from another state, it is
presumed that the legislature adopted the construction placed upor the law by the court decisions of
the state from which the statute was taken. See Bartels, 276 N.W.2d at 118. Consequently, since
North Dakota copied Wisconsin's comparative negligence law, the court applied Wisconsin's
treatment ofa nonreleased tortfeasor in comparative negligence actions. Id. at 119.
103. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 515. In arriving at the conclusion that North Dakota was only
presumed to follow Wisconsin's and Minnesota's lead in comparative negligence issues, the Beaudoin
court observed that in Bartels, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in interpreting section 9-10-07 of
the North Dakota Century Code, did not slavishly follow Wisconsin's and Minnesota's comparative
negligence rulings, but determined that the rationale presented in them was merely "persuasive."
Id.; see Bartels, 276 N.W.2d at 120. Moreover, in Mauch v. Manufacturer Sales & Services, Inc., the
presumption that North Dakota blindly follows the ruling of Wisconsin and Minnesota in
comparative negligence issues was rebutted. Mauch v. Manufacturer Sales & Servs., Inc., 345
N.W.2d 338, 348 n.2 (N.D. 1984). In Mauch, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected Wisconsin's
application of modified comparative negligence to products liability cases. Id. at 347-48. Instead, the
court applied pure comparative negligence to products liability actions arising in North Dakota. Id.
at 348.
104. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 515. The court in Beaudoin contended that not only was
Wisconsin and Minnesota case law not dispositive of comparative negligence issues in North Dakota,
but that the North Dakota Supreme Court has often looked to other states besides those two for aid in
resolving comparative negligence disputes. Id. In Bartels, the North Dakota Supreme Court
considered Texas law and various legal writings in addition to Wisconsin and Minnesota case law in
deciding how to treat released and nonreleased tortfeasors in a negligence action. See Bartels, 276
N.W.2d at 121.
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determined that it would adhere to the presumption that the North
Dakota Supreme Court would follow the individual rule, as
adopted by Wisconsin and Minnesota, unless there were
countervailing
considerations
which would rebut
that
05
presumption. 1
The court found countervailing considerations which rebutted
the presumption that North Dakota will follow Wisconsin's
interpretation of comparative negligence when it rejected the
individual rule in Beaudoin, because the court concluded that there
were many countervailing considerations which favored the
adoption of the unit rule.1 0 6 The fact that the unit rule was the
majority rule and modern trend was found by the court to be
compelling. 0 7 In addition, the court recognized that the weight of
authority favored the unit rule because, in part, those jurisdictions
which followed the individual rule had done so on the rather
wooden analysis that the legislature must have intended the
individual rule when it copied Wisconsin's comparative negligence
statute. 108
Moreover, the court determined that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court itself did not wholeheartedly adhere to the individual rule,
but followed it only because of precedent. 0 9 The court stated that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has asserted in past decisions that
the individual rule leads to harsh and unfair results. 1 0 The court
105. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 515.
106. Id. at 517. The court in Beaudoin stated that the numerous and compelling factors pointing
towards the adoption ofthe unit rule weighed against an election of the individual rule. Id.
107. Id. at 515-16. Twenty-one states favor the unit rule while only five adopted the individual
rule. See sources cited supra note 81 and accompanying text. In addition, the court recognized that all
seven states that have decided the multitortfeasor comparison problem in the last five years have
elected the unit rule. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 516; see sources cited supra note 81 and accompanying
text.
108. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 516. The court contended that none of the jurisdictions which
follow the individual rule have based arguments for the adoption of the rule on its merits. Id. Rather
the court stated that these jurisdictions decided in favor of the individual rule because of precedent
and so-called legislative intent created by the court's belief that the legislature must have intended
the individual rule when it adopted Wisconsin's statute. Id.
109. Id. at 517. The court contended that one of the most telling strikes against the individual
rule was that it was no longer receiving great support in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Id. For a
discussion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decreased support of the individual rule, see supra notes
79-80 and accompanying text.
110. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 517; see May v. Skelley Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d 30, __,
264
N.W.2d 574, 578 (1978). The Beaudoin court asserted that in Skelley, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
stated in dicta that the individual rule led to harsh and unjust results. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 517.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the rule, however, since the issue of whether to adopt the unit
rule became moot when one of two defendants was determined not to be negligent because he did not
have sufficient notice of the danger. See Skelley, 83 Wis. 2d at -,
264 N.W.2d at 574. For a more
detailed discussion of Skelley, see supra note 79. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court had a chance
to adopt the unit rule in Reiter v. Dyken, it decided not to rely on the dicta expressed in Skelley and
upheld the individual rule merely on the basis of stare decisis, deferring the ultimate decision of the
issue to the Wisconsin Legislature. See Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461,
-, 290 N.W.2d 510, 517
(1980) (legislative intent was found by the fact the Wisconsin Legislature switched from the fortynine percent to fifty percent comparative negligence form and did not implement language of the law
to expressly provide for the unit rule). For a more detailed discussion of Reiter, see supra note 55.
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reasoned that North Dakota should not fall in the trap of blindly
following Wisconsin's precedent, but should learn from
Wisconsin's trial and error in construing comparative
negligence. 1 Therefore, because it believed North Dakota was not
mandated to apply Wisconsin's and Minnesota's interpretation of
comparative negligence to section 9-10-07 of 2the North Dakota
Century Code, the court adopted the unit rule. 1
Statutory construction was the final compelling reason which,3
11
according to the court, commanded the election of the unit rule.
The court stated that it was not clear from the text of section 9-1007 of the North Dakota Century Code whether the legislature
intended to apply the individual rule or the unit rule." 4 In the
absence of the plain meaning of a statute, the court recognized that
section 1-01-35 of the North Dakota Century Code allows the
1 5
singular words in the Code to also mean the plural. 1
Consequently, the court asserted that the strongly mandated rule of
construction in section 1-01-35 required the word "person" in
section 9-10-07 to also mean "persons" and therefore, the court
1 16
adopted the unit rule.

In applying the unit rule to the facts in Beaudoin, the court had
to decide whether the phrase "person against whom recovery is
111. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 517. The court stated that North Dakota was not caught in the
trap of being bound by prior inequitable decisions and, therefore, was free to elect the unit rule. Id.
The Beaudoin court also contended that the North Dakota Supreme Court had previously recognized
that it would be foolish to go through the same growing pains Wisconsin did when the refined
product is readily available for viewing. Id.; see Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 120
(N.D. 1979) (it would be foolish for North Dakota to blindly follow Wisconsin's and Minnesota's
interpretation of modified comparative negligence when it can study the refined product so as to
see supra note 102.
preclude adopting its flaws). For a more detailed discussion of Bartels,
112. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 517; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987) (suspended fromJuly
8, 1987 through June 30, 1993) (contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action if such
negligence is not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought). The court
determined that the correct decision was to adopt the unit rule and, therefore, avoid the problem
which Wisconsin had created by having prior law that impeded progress. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at
517.

113. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 516; see North v. Bunday, 735 P.2d 270, 273 (Mont. 1983). In
North, the Montana Supreme Court by applying statutory construction, determined that the singular
word "person" in Montana's Comparative Negligence Law also meant the plural "persons." Id.
114. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 9-10-07 (1987) (suspended fromJuly 8, 1987 throughJune 30,
1993) (contributory negligence shall not bar recovery if the negligence is not as great as. the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought). For the relevant text of 9-10-07, see supra
note 3.
1-01-35 (1987). Section 1-01-35 of
115. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 516; see N.D. CENT. CODE
the North Dakota Century Code provides: "Words used in the singular number include the plural
and words used in the plural number include the singular, except when a contrary intention plainly
appears." Id.
116. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 516; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-35 (1987) (words in their
singular include the plural); id. § 9-10-07 (1987) (suspended from July 8, 1987 through June 30,
1993) (contributory negligence shall not bar recovery if the negligence is not as great as the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought). The court concluded that the application
of S 1-01-35 to § 9-10-07 aggregated the negligence of the defendants and thus, commanded the
adoption of the unit rule. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 516.
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sought" in section 9-10-07 included statutorily immune employers
who were not made parties to a suit. 1 17 If Wood Wireline's
negligence was not considered since Wood Wireline was
immune from Beaudoin's negligence action by virtue of their
employment relationship,' 18 then Texaco's negligence would
individually be compared against Beaudoin's, which might have
kept Texaco from being liable. 1 9 The court followed the lead of
other states, however, and held that Wood Wireline's negligence
would be considered in allocating the responsibility for Beaudoin's
injuries.120 Therefore, Beaudoin's apportioned negligence (thirty
percent) was compared against the negligence of Texaco (ten
percent) and Wood Wireline (sixty percent) in the aggregate
(seventy percent). 11
The final issue before the court wag'whether Texaco was liable
only for its individual share of Beaudoin's injuries or also for the
share of negligence attributed to Wood Wireline.1 22 The court
stated that in North Dakota a joint tortfeasor is liable for the share
117. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 517; seeN.D. CENT. CODE §9-10-07 (1987)(suspended from July
8, 1987 through June 30, 1993) (contributory negligence shall not bar recovery if such negligence is
not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought). For the relevant text of
section 9-10-07, see supra note 3.
118. See Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 517-18. Beaudoin did not make Wood Wireline a party to the
suit because Wood Wireline was immune from liability under § 65-04-28 of the North Dakota
Century Code's Worker's Compensation Law. Id. at 518; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-04-28 (1985)
(employers who comply with this law are not liable to respond in damages for injury or death to any
employee). For the relevant text of 65-04-28, see supra note 5.
119. See Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 517-18. The court stated that since an employer is immune
from suit, it would be futile for Beaudoin to bring an action against Wood Wireline. Id. at 518. Thus,
if Wood Wireline's negligence was not taken into account in allocating responsibility it would in
effect be wiped away because Beaudoin could not bring any action to have Wood Wireline's sixty
percent apportioned negligence attributed to Texaco. See id. Therefore, Beaudoin would be denied
recovery because his apportioned fault of thirty percent was greater than the ten percent apportioned
to Texaco, the only defendant in the suit. Id.
120. Id. at 517-18; see, e.g., Pape v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 231 Kan. 441, 449, 647 P.2d
320, 326 (1982). In Pope, the widow and children of a deceased farm elevator worker brought a
wrongful death and survivorship action against the electric company which installed the insulated
electric wires which caused the decedent's death. Id. at 441-42, 647 P.2d at 322. The Kansas
Supreme Court held that under Kansas' comparative negligence law, the decendent's employer,
though immune, should have its negligence taken into account. Id. at 449, 647 P.2d at 326. In so
holding, the court stated that the phrase 'parties against whom a claim for recovery is made' in
Kansas' comparative negligence statute included immune employers. Id. at 449, 647 P.2d at 326; see
KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-258a (1983) (the negligence of all the parties should be considered in
comparative negligence actions and those parties that contributed to the injury not a party to the
action should bejoined). SeealsdBaird %. Phillips Petroleum Co., 535 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (D. Kan.
1982) (Kansas' comparative negligence law gives a defendant in a tort action a substantive right to
have all negligence compared in a single action even if all the tortfeasors are immune from suit);
Gaither ex rel. Chalfin v. City of Tulsa, 664 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Okla. 1983) (no requirement that one
must be a party to the lawsuit before his or her negligence may be considered by the jury in
determinnig negligence calculations). !
.
121. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 518 The court's interpretation is consistent with North Dakota's
view that the negligence of all the parties should be considered when deciding on individual liability.
SeeDay v. General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349, 354 (N.D. 1984) (all the negligence of the
parties involved in the resulting injujries or damages is to be considered).
122. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 518. Although Texaco was liable to Beaudoin pursuant to the
unit rule, the question remained whether Texaco was only liable for ten percent of Beaudoin's
damages, or whether Texaco could also be liable for the portion of damages attributable to Wood
Wireline. See id.
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of negligence attributed to a statutorily immune employer. 123 Thus,
the court held Texaco liable for Wood Wireline's apportioned fault
of sixty percent, in addition to its own ten percent. 124
The court conceded that an equitable result in the case was
impossible. 125 Either Texaco was liable under the unit rule for
seventy percent of the damages, even though only ten percent
negligent, or under the individual rule, Beaudoin would be denied
recovery because his negligence of thirty percent was greater than
the ten percent apportioned to Texaco alone.1 26 The court asserted,
however, that the inequity that arose when Texaco was ordered to
pay seventy percent of the damages was due to the doctrine of joint
and several liability and the immunity provision of section 65-0427
28 of the North Dakota Century Code, and not the unit rule.1
Therefore, the court applied the unit rule and held Texaco liable
28
for seventy percent of Beaudoin's damages. 1
123. Id.; see Layman v. Braunschweigische Maschinenbauanstalt, Inc. 343 N.W.2d 334, 348-50
(N.D. 1983). In Layman, Layman sought to recover for injuries received when he became entangled
with a sugar beet crystallizer. Id. at 337. The jury apportioned twenty-five percent of the negligence
to the plant designer and seventy-five percent to the plant owner, Layman's employer. Id. at 338.
The trial court held the plant designer liable for twenty-five percent of the damages and precluded
Layman any recovery from the plant owner because it was a statutorily immune employer. Id. In
reversing, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that a negligent tortfeasor is liable for the share of
negligence attributed to a statutorily immune employer. Id. at 350. Thus, the plant designer was
liable for all of Layman's injuries. Id.
124. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 518. Under joint and several liability as applied by § 9-10-07, a
defendant is liable for the whole award but is entitled to contribution from the other tortfeasors
according to their apportioned fault. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-10-07 (1987) (suspended from July 8,
1987 through June 30, 1993) (each tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable for the whole award); see
also Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry & Mach. Co., 376 N.W.2d 323, 334 n.7 (1985). In Hoerr, a worker
who was injured by a high-speed wood shaper brought a products liability action against the
manufacturer, distributor, and seller of the machine. Id. at 325. In holding that Hoerr could have
judgment entered on negligent fault, rather than on a products liability assessment, the court
adopted the Uniform Comparative Fault Act's definition ofjoint and several liability which provides
that the plaintiffcan recover from any defendant the total amount of his judgment. See id. at 334 n. 7;
see UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT S 2 comment, 12 U.L.A. 44 (1979): The Uniform
Comparative Fault Act also provides that under joint and several liability, the defendant who pays
all of a plaintifl's claim is entitled to contribution from the other defendants based on their
apportioned fault. Id. However, in North Dakota, a tortfeasor cannot obtain contribution from an
immune tortfeasor. See Layman, 343 N.W.2d at 350 (negligent tortfeasor has no right to contribution
from a negligent employer immune from suit by operation of the worker's compensation statutes).
125. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 518.
126. Id. The court stated that a collision of legal principles rendered an equitable result
impossible. Id. The conflicting legal principles which the court had to apply were either the
individual rule, which barred Beaudoin's recovery, or joint and sev-ral liability and the immunity
provision under North Dakota's worker's compensation laws, which when coupled with the unit
rule, necessitated that Texaco pays seventy percent of the damages while only ten percent negligent.
See id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987) (suspended from July 8, 1987 through June 30, 1993)
(each tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable for the whole award); id. § 65-04-28 (1985) (employers
who comply with the provision of this chapter are not liable for injury or death to an employee).
127. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 518; N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987) (suspended 1987) (each
tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable for the whole award); id. § 65-04-28 (1985) (employers who
comply with the provisions of this chapter are not liable for injury to or death of an employee).
128. Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 518. The court stated that by electing the unit rule and rejecting
the individual rule, it declined to adopt an outmoded and inequitable rule that works injustice. Id. It
asserted, however, that another outmoded rule, joint and several liability, still remained to prevent a
just outcome. Id. According to the court, if several liability had been adopted by North Dakota at the
time, the combination of that rule with the unit rule would produce a just result because Beaudoin
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Prior to Beaudoin, North Dakota's state district courts
interpreted the individual rule as the rule which was to be implied
129
out of North Dakota's 1973 comparative negligence law.
Furthermore, the presumption that North Dakota will follow
Wisconsin's precedent on comparative negligence issues has been
eroded by Beaudoin.130 In addition, Beaudoin may persuade the
North Dakota judiciary to be more open to interpreting for itself
the old comparative negligence statute and the new comparative
fault statute instead of deferring such decisions to the North Dakota
Legislature. 13 1 Moreover, the need for judicial intervention in
comparative negligence issues was made apparent by the
inequitable result reached in Beaudoin when the legal principles of
joint and several liability, worker's compensation immunity, and
comparative negligence, collided to produce an unavoidably
132
inequitable result.

The most ,triking impact o, Beaudoin is the aid it gives in
determining whether the combined or individual comparison
approach is to be applied to claims not covered by North Dakota's
new comparative fault law.133 Under Beaudoin's application of the
would not be barred recovery and Texaco would only have been liable for ten percent of the
damages. Id.
129. See Keyes v. Amundson, 343 N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1983), rev'don othergrounds, 391 N.W.2d
602 (N.D. 1986). In Keyes, the Northwest District Court of North Dakota apparently applied the
individual rule because it denied recovery to a forty percent negligent plaintiff for his injuries
resulting from a motorcycle accident, because the plaintiff's apportioned fault was greater than the
individual negligence of any of the defendants. Id. Since the plaintiff did not raise the issue on
appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court did not address the question of whether North Dakota's
comparative negligence law prohibited recovery when the plaintiff's negligence is greater than the
combined fault of the defendants. Id. at n. 1.
130. Compare Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 515 (court stated that North Dakota will follow
Wisconsin's lead in comparative negligence issues unless there was some compelling reason not to)
with Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W. 2d at 118 (where a statute is taken from another state and
adopted without change, it is presumed that the North Dakota Legislature adopted the construction
placed upon the law by the court of last resort in the state from which the statute was taken).
131. Compare Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 517 (court was convinced that the North Dakota
Supreme Court would apply the unit rule to North Dakota's comparative negligence law) with Krise
v. Gillund, 184 N.W.2d 405, 409 (N.D. 1971) (court refused to change from contributory negligence
to comparative negligence because it felt that this was a matter best left for the legislature).
132. See Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 518 (the court stated that the collision of legal principles
rendered a truly equitable result impossible). Prosser and Keeton state that joint and several liability
is rationalized, in part, because the defendant that pays the judgment is allowed contribution from
the other tortfeasors. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 475-76 (5th ed. 1984). They infer, however,
that this rationale is not furthered when an immune tortfeasor is involved because the deep-pocket
defendant is liable for all thejudgment. Id. at 476.
133. See Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 518. North Dakota's new comparative fault law is to be
applied prospectively to actions arising before the effective date of the law, July 8, 1987. See Act
approved April 9, 1987, ch. 404, 1987 N.D. Laws 989 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-03.2-02
(Supp. 1987)) (this act is effective through June 30, 1993, and after that date is ineffective without
legislative approval). For the relevant text of the new comparative fault law, see supra note 84. For a
discussion of the prospective application of the 1987 comparative fault law, see supra notes 84-95, and
accompanying text. Consequently, actions that arise before the 1987 comparative fault law will be
governed by S 9-10-07 of the North Dakota Century Code and the unit rule. See Beaudoin, 653 F.
Supp. at 517; N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-10-07 (1987) (suspended from July 8, 1987 through June 30,
1993) (each tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable for the whole award).
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unit rule to pre-July 1987 comparative negligence actions, a
negligent plaintiff has no fear of losing a valid claim because there
are numerous defendants. 13 4 Finally, in light of Beaudoin, the
adoption of several liability by the new 1987 comparative fault law
highlights the fact that the law has produced a just answer to some
of the problems which hampered North Dakota under its old
135
comparative negligence provision.
MARK RICHARD HANSON

134. See Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 518 (adoption of the individual rule would preclude Beaudoin
from recovering because there are two defendants to which his liability would be compared against);
356 S.W.2d 20, 26 (1962) (plaintiff ten percent negligent
see also Walton v.Tull, 234 Ark. 882, -,
was allowed to recover pursuant to the unit rule from a defendant also ten percent negligent even
though the plaintiff's negligence was as great as the defendant's). The Arkansas Supreme Court
adopted the unit rule in Walton because it viewed the individual rule as unfair in cases where there
are many defendants who were equally at fault and the plaintiff's negligence, although relatively
minor, is greater than the negligence of any one defendant. Id. For a discussion of Walton, see supra
notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
135. See Beaudoin, 653 F. Supp. at 518. The court expressed the view that the combination of
joint and several liability with the individual rule in an action involving a statutorily immune
tortfeasor caused an inequitable result. Id. In adopting the unit rule to pre-July 1987 comparative
negligence actions, Beaudoin allows North Dakota's two comparative negligence laws to be consistent
and complimentary because the new comparative fault law also adopted the unit rule. See Beaudoin,
653 F. Supp. at 517; Act approved April 9, 1987, ch. 404, 1987 N.D. Laws 989 (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE S 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987)) (plaintiff's negligence should be compared against the person or persons against whom recovery is sought). The 1987 comparative negligence law also adopted
several liability. See td. (when two or more parties have contributed to the injury, the liability of each
is several only). The court in Beaudoin stated that the combination of the unit rule with several
liability produced more equitable results in multitortfeasor comparative negligence actions than can
be achieved if either the individual rule or joint and several liability are applied. Beaudoin, 653 F.

Supp. at 518.

